Bona fide reliance on counsel constitutes sufficient cause to condone delay against an unreasoned ex parte decree.

The first respondent/plaintiff instituted O.S. No. 672 of 2009 seeking declarations that certain sale deeds executed in favour of the petitioner and another defendant were null and void, along with a permanent injunction.

The plaintiff claimed a share in the suit property as a legal heir and co-sharer, while the petitioner, the eighth defendant, claimed to be a bona fide purchaser of portions of the property under registered sale deeds.

The defendants engaged a common counsel, but failed to file their written statements and were set ex parte.

An ex parte decree was passed on 4 August 2011.

The petitioner alleged that he had entrusted the litigation to the other defendants and their counsel, and became aware of the decree only upon receiving a notice dated 4 March 2013.

He thereafter filed an application under Order IX Rule 13 CPC, along with an application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act to condone a delay of 576 days.

The Additional District Munsif dismissed the condone-delay application, holding that the delay was insufficiently explained and that the petitioner had been negligent.

Whether the petitioner had shown sufficient cause under Section 5 of the Limitation Act for condoning the 576-day delay in filing the application to set aside the ex parte decree?

Whether the absence of reasons, findings and proper adjudication in the ex parte decree justified granting the petitioner an opportunity to contest the suit on merits?

Whether the Trial Court had properly exercised its discretion in dismissing the condone-delay application?

The Court applied Section 5 of the Limitation Act, under which delay may be condoned upon proof of “sufficient cause,” and Order IX Rule 13 CPC, which permits an ex parte decree to be set aside in appropriate circumstances.

The revisional jurisdiction under Section 115 CPC was invoked to examine the correctness of the Trial Court’s order.

Under Order XX Rules 4(2) and 5 CPC, a judgment must contain a concise statement of the case, points for determination, findings and reasons; these requirements apply even to an ex parte judgment.

Relying on Meenakshi v. Andal, Management Neptune Travels India Pvt. Ltd. v. Special Deputy Commissioner, Labour, Brahmand Farm Lands Ltd. v. K. Venkatesan and Meenakshisundaram Textiles v. Valli Textiles Ltd., the Court held that an ex parte decree cannot be granted merely because the defendant is absent and must reflect consideration of the pleadings, evidence and relief claimed.

The Court also relied on Kumari Sahu v. Bhubananda Sahu for the principle that litigants may reasonably depend upon counsel, and on Arunoday Singh v. Lee Anne Elton for adopting a liberal approach where refusal to condone delay would defeat adjudication on merits.

The High Court found that the petitioner had entrusted the matter to the common counsel engaged by the family members, who were also defendants in the connected litigation.

The fact that the same counsel appeared in both proceedings and that the defendants remained ex parte raised a serious doubt whether the petitioner had been deliberately or effectively prevented from contesting the suit.

The Court further noted that the ex parte decree dated 4 August 2011 contained no properly framed issues, findings or reasons, despite the plaintiff’s own claim being limited to a share in the joint property.

The legal effect of alienations by co-sharers and the plaintiff’s asserted limited share had not been examined.

These circumstances constituted sufficient cause under Section 5 of the Limitation Act and warranted an opportunity to contest the matter on merits.

The Court considered that the interests of justice were better served by condoning the delay subject to costs rather than allowing an apparently unreasoned ex parte decree to stand.

The delay of 576 days in filing the application to set aside the ex parte decree was condoned, subject to the petitioner paying Rs.20,000 to the first respondent within three weeks from receipt of the order.

If the amount was not paid within the stipulated time, the revision petition would stand dismissed.

Upon compliance, the Trial Court was directed to proceed with the case and dispose of it within six months, uninfluenced by the observations made in the revision order.