Burden of proving cruelty ‘soon before death’ is essential to invoke statutory presumption under Section 304B.

The Appellant married the deceased in 1988.

On 29.04.1992, a village chaukidar (Informant) learned that the deceased had died after allegedly consuming poison.

The Informant alleged the matrimonial family cremated the body hurriedly to destroy evidence before police arrival.

The prosecution alleged the deceased was harassed for a color television.

The trial court convicted the Appellant under Sections 304B (dowry death) and 201 (disappearing evidence) of the IPC, sentencing him to life imprisonment.

The Appellant challenged this, citing a lack of medical evidence, non-examination of the Investigating Officer (IO), and the absence of proof of cruelty "soon before death".

1. Whether the prosecution established that the death occurred otherwise than under normal circumstances and was connected to dowry harassment "soon before death" to satisfy Section 304B IPC?

2. Whether the statutory presumption under Section 113B of the Evidence Act can be invoked in the absence of medical evidence and specific proximity of cruelty?

3. Whether the non-examination of the Investigating Officer caused material prejudice to the Appellant’s defense?

The court applied Section 304B of the IPC, which defines dowry death as a death occurring within seven years of marriage under abnormal circumstances following cruelty "soon before death" in connection with dowry.

It relied on Section 113B of the Indian Evidence Act, which mandates a presumption of dowry death only after the prosecution proves the "foundational facts".

The court further cited the precedent *Karan Singh v. State of Haryana (2025)*, which clarifies that vague, general allegations without specific proximity or a "live link" to the death are insufficient for conviction.

The High Court found the prosecution failed to prove the foundational facts requisite for Section 304B.

First, there was no medical evidence or post-mortem report to establish the cause of death as "unnatural".

Second, the testimonies of the parental witnesses (P.W.1, P.W.7) contained only general allegations of a demand for a television and failed to show specific instances of cruelty "soon before death".

The court noted that independent witnesses from the matrimonial village did not support the harassment claims.

Furthermore, the non-examination of the IO was held to be fatal, as it prevented the defense from proving contradictions in witness statements.

Consequently, since the "live link" between the alleged demand and death was missing, the trial court erred in invoking the Section 113B presumption based on mere suspicion.

The High Court set aside the conviction and life sentence under Section 304B IPC and the conviction under Section 201 IPC.

The Appellant was acquitted of all charges and ordered to be released forthwith.