Candidature cannot be cancelled solely on an FIR closed for want of evidence after truthful disclosure.

The applicant was implicated in FIR No. 261/2012 registered at Police Station Kumaraswamy Layout, Bengaluru, under Sections 341, 324, 377, 384, 448, 506 and 34 IPC, along with Sections 116 and 117 of the Karnataka Education Act, 1983.

The State Forensic Science Laboratory report dated 18.01.2013 was negative, and the Investigating Officer submitted a Final Report for want of evidence. The Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Bengaluru, accepted the Final Report on 14.02.2014.

The applicant subsequently applied for the post of Sub-Inspector (Executive), Delhi Police Examination–2015, and was provisionally selected on merit. He truthfully disclosed the FIR and its closure in his attestation form.

After issuing a show-cause notice dated 06.02.2017, the respondents cancelled his candidature by order dated 18.12.2018, treating his alleged involvement in a case under Section 377 IPC as indicative of a “bully-type” propensity and unsuitability for a disciplined police force.

Whether the respondents could lawfully cancel the applicant’s candidature solely on the basis of an FIR which had been closed by a Final Report accepted by the jurisdictional Magistrate, despite the applicant’s truthful disclosure of the case?

Whether the Screening Committee’s conclusion that the applicant possessed a “bully-type” criminal propensity was arbitrary when the criminal case did not proceed to trial, the forensic evidence was negative, and no prima facie case was found?

Whether the applicant was entitled to reconsideration for appointment with consequential benefits?

The Tribunal primarily applied the principles in Avtar Singh v. Union of India, (2016) 8 SCC 471, particularly that a candidate must truthfully disclose criminal involvement, but that truthful disclosure does not automatically compel appointment; the employer must objectively consider the nature of the case, the outcome, applicable rules, and the circumstances of the acquittal or closure.

Under Commissioner of Police v. Mehar Singh, (2013) 7 SCC 685, a police employer may assess the nature of the offence, the extent of involvement, whether the acquittal or discharge was clean, and the candidate’s propensity for future criminal conduct; however, the Screening Committee’s decision remains subject to judicial review where it is mala fide, arbitrary, extraneous, or legally unsound.

Union Territory, Chandigarh Administration v. Pradeep Kumar, (2018) 1 SCC 797 similarly recognizes Screening Committee discretion principally where the acquittal or discharge is not clean.

The Tribunal also relied on Mohammed Imran v. State of Maharashtra, (2019) 17 SCC 696, holding that unproved allegations cannot mechanically establish criminal propensity or unfitness, and on Commissioner of Police v. Sandeep Kumar, (2011) 4 SCC 644, concerning the disproportionate consequences of relying on stale and unproved allegations.

The impugned action was also tested against the guarantees of non-arbitrariness and equal opportunity under Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution.

The Tribunal held that the applicant had made no suppression or false declaration; rather, he had fully disclosed the FIR and its closure, satisfying the disclosure requirement under Avtar Singh.

The criminal proceedings had not resulted in an acquittal based on benefit of doubt or a technical defect; they had ended at the Final Report stage because the forensic report was negative and the investigating agency found no prima facie case, with the Final Report thereafter accepted by the Magistrate.

Although the respondents could consider antecedents even after truthful disclosure, the Screening Committee relied essentially on the untested contents of the FIR, particularly Section 377 IPC, and failed to address the negative forensic report, absence of corroborating evidence, judicial acceptance of the Final Report, and the applicant’s candid disclosure.

Its conclusion that the applicant exhibited a “bully-type” propensity was therefore unsupported by legally relevant material and constituted an arbitrary exercise of discretion.

The principles in Mehar Singh and Pradeep Kumar, which concern non-clean acquittals or serious cases requiring assessment of unresolved antecedent concerns, were held inapplicable on these facts.

The respondents were directed to reconsider his case for appointment as Sub-Inspector (Executive), Delhi Police Examination–2015, in accordance with Avtar Singh, treating the closure of the FIR at the Final Report stage and the applicant’s full disclosure as material circumstances in his favour, and to pass a reasoned order within eight weeks of receiving the certified order.

If found eligible and subject to there being no other legal impediment, the applicant was to be appointed with consequential benefits, including consideration of seniority and notional benefits in accordance with law.

There was no order as to costs.