Casteist remarks inside closed premises without public witnesses do not satisfy the “public view” requirement.

The petitioners challenged, under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, the order dated 8 March 2022 framing charges in C.C. No. 04/2019 under Section 3(1)(x) of the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989, along with Sections 323, 427, 500, 506, 186, 353 and 34 of the IPC.

Respondent No. 2, a police inspector, alleged that petitioner No. 1, the school principal, made caste-based remarks against him inside a classroom on the second floor of the school during an inspection following a fire incident; the school chowkidar had allegedly been asked to remain downstairs.

It was further alleged that petitioner No. 2, the husband of petitioner No. 1, subsequently made caste-related derogatory remarks, manhandled respondent No. 2, damaged his spectacles and obstructed the discharge of his official duties near the principal’s office.

The petitioners contended that the complaint was a counterblast to an earlier FIR lodged by petitioner No. 1 against respondent No. 2 and that the alleged remarks were not made “within public view”.

Whether the alleged caste-based remarks attributed to petitioner No. 1, made inside a classroom in the absence of other persons, were uttered “within public view” so as to attract Section 3(1)(x) of the SC/ST Act.

Whether the alleged conduct of petitioner No. 2 near the principal’s office, witnessed by the school chowkidar from outside the school gate, occurred “within public view” under Section 3(1)(x) of the SC/ST Act.

The Court applied Section 482 CrPC, which empowers the High Court to exercise its inherent jurisdiction to prevent abuse of process and secure the ends of justice, and Section 3(1)(x) of the SC/ST Act, 1989, concerning intentional insult or intimidation of a member of a Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe in a place “within public view”.

Relying principally on Swaran Singh v. State, 2008 (8) SCC 435, the Court held that “within public view” is distinct from “public place”: a private place may nevertheless be within public view if members of the public can see or hear the incident, whereas an occurrence inside a building, without the presence or direct visibility of members of the public, would not satisfy the requirement.

The Court also referred to Gunjan @ Girija Kumari v. State, 2026 INSC 468, Hitesh Verma v. State of Uttarakhand, AIR 2020 SC 5584, and Karuppudayar v. State, 2025 INSC 132, as cited authorities on the scope of the expression.

With respect to petitioner No. 1, the complaint itself indicated that the alleged remarks were made while she and respondent No. 2 were alone inside a second-floor classroom, while the chowkidar had been kept downstairs.

Since no person was present at the spot to hear the alleged remarks, the Court held that the incident was not shown to have occurred within public view; mere alleged observation from a distance could not establish that the remarks were heard or directly witnessed.

In contrast, petitioner No. 2’s alleged conduct occurred near the principal’s office, and the chowkidar testified that, while standing outside the school gate, he saw petitioner No. 2 thrashing and abusing respondent No. 2 with casteist remarks.

Applying Swaran Singh, the Court found that the incident was not confined to a closed premise and was capable of being seen by a member of the public, thereby satisfying the “within public view” requirement at the prima facie stage.

The charges against petitioner No. 2 under Section 3(1)(x) were sustained because the alleged incident was prima facie witnessed from outside the school premises.

The Trial Court was permitted to proceed with the trial against petitioner No. 2 in accordance with law, and the petition was disposed of in those terms.