Challenge to Section 123 Army Act Invocation Constitutes a Service Matter Subject to Armed Forces Tribunal Jurisdiction

The petitioner, a retired army personnel, challenged an order of invocation dated May 18, 2026, issued under Section 123 of the Army Act, 1950

The petitioner argued that as a long-retired individual, the respondent authorities were attempting to jeopardize him by issuing the impugned order

the respondent authorities raised a preliminary objection regarding the maintainability of the writ petition, contending that the subject matter fell within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Armed Forces Tribunal

Whether the writ petition is maintainable before the High Court in light of the provisions of the Armed Forces Tribunal Act, 2007

Section 3(o) of the Armed Forces Tribunal Act, 2007, which defines "service matters" broadly to include remuneration, pension, retirement benefits, and summary disposal/trials

Section 14 of the same Act, which vests the Tribunal with all jurisdiction, powers, and authority exercisable by all courts (except the Supreme Court and High Courts under Articles 226/227) in relation to all service matters

Section 123 of the Army Act, 1950, concerning the liability of persons who have ceased to be subject to military law

The Court examined the nature of the impugned order and found that it was issued under Section 123 of the Army Act in connection with the petitioner's actions while he was still in active service

the Court determined that the dispute falls squarely within the definition of "service matters" under Section 3(o) of the Armed Forces Tribunal Act, 2007

Applying Section 14 of the Act, the Court reasoned that the statutory remedy lies with the Armed Forces Tribunal rather than the High Court’s writ jurisdiction at this stage

The Court emphasized that the Tribunal is empowered to decide both questions of law and facts

The petition was disposed of with a direction that the petitioner may approach the Armed Forces Tribunal within fifteen working days; if so filed, the Tribunal shall not treat the application as delayed

Liberty was granted to the petitioner to approach the High Court again on the same cause of action only if it is found that the Tribunal is not functioning effectively