Challenges to void dismissal orders remain subject to Article 58’s three-year limitation period.

The appellant, a police constable appointed on 2 January 1990, was prosecuted in FIR No. 115 dated 9 June 1994 concerning the death of his wife. He was convicted by the Additional Sessions Judge, Patiala, on 15 July 1996 and sentenced to life imprisonment. On the basis of the conviction, the Senior Superintendent of Police dismissed him from service with effect from 15 July 1996 by order dated 21 January 1997. His departmental appeal was rejected by the DIG, Patiala Range, on 25 September 1997. His criminal appeal was also dismissed by the High Court on 12 August 1997.

The appellant remained in custody until 4 January 2003 and thereafter instituted a suit on 4 April 2003 seeking a declaration that the dismissal and appellate orders were illegal, void, unconstitutional and contrary to Article 311(2) of the Constitution and Rule 16.2 of the Punjab Police Rules, 1934, along with consequential service benefits.

The Trial Court held that the dismissal was premature but dismissed the suit as barred by limitation. The First Appellate Court affirmed the dismissal, holding additionally that dismissal based on conviction for an offence involving grave moral turpitude did not require a prior departmental inquiry.

Whether the suit seeking a declaration against the dismissal order and the departmental appellate order was filed within the limitation prescribed under Article 58 of the Limitation Act, 1963.

Whether the appellant’s period of incarceration postponed or suspended the commencement of limitation, or constituted a legal disability under the Limitation Act, 1963.

Whether an order alleged to be void or passed in violation of Article 311(2) and Rule 16.2 of the Punjab Police Rules could be challenged beyond the limitation period prescribed for a declaratory suit.

A suit for a declaration not covered by Articles 56 or 57 of the Limitation Act, 1963 is governed by Article 58, which prescribes three years from the date on which the right to sue first accrues. Under Section 3 of the Limitation Act, every suit instituted after the prescribed period must be dismissed, even if limitation has not been pleaded.

The Supreme Court’s decision in Nikhila Divyang Mehta v. Hitesh P. Sanghvi, 2025 INSC 485, was relied upon for the principle that limitation under Article 58 begins when the right to sue first accrues and cannot be postponed until fuller knowledge is obtained; consequential reliefs dependent on a time-barred declaration also fail.

Sections 6 to 9 of the Limitation Act recognise specified legal disabilities and interruption principles, but ordinary incarceration following conviction is not such a disability.

Relying on State of Punjab v. Gurdev Singh, (1991) 4 SCC 1, the Court held that even an allegedly void, illegal or ultra vires dismissal order has de facto operation until declared invalid by a competent court, and must be challenged within the prescribed limitation period.

The appellant’s right to sue had accrued, at the latest, on 25 September 1997, when his departmental appeal was rejected and the adverse service decision became final for purposes of the civil claim. Accordingly, the three-year period under Article 58 expired on 25 September 2000, whereas the suit was filed only on 4 April 2003.

The appellant’s release from custody on 4 January 2003 neither revived the cause of action nor postponed the commencement of limitation.

The Court rejected the contention that incarceration prevented institution of the suit, observing that a civil proceeding could be instituted and prosecuted through counsel and that the appellant had, in fact, pursued his criminal appeal through counsel while incarcerated.

The plea that the dismissal order was void also did not assist the appellant: under Gurdev Singh, an allegedly void order must still be challenged by an appropriate declaratory proceeding within the statutory period.

Since the principal declaratory relief was time-barred, the consequential claim for continuity of service and other benefits could not survive independently.

The Regular Second Appeal was dismissed, and the judgments and decrees of the Trial Court and First Appellate Court were upheld.