Revenue mutation proceedings do not warrant limitation exclusion under Section 14 of the Limitation Act.

The applicants sought condonation under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963, of a delay of 3,199 days in filing a Second Appeal against the judgment and decree dated 23 March 2017 passed by the 7th Additional District Judge, Banaskantha at Palanpur, in Regular Civil Appeal No. 41 of 2007.

The applicants had themselves instituted the first appeal, which was partly allowed, but did not challenge the appellate judgment within limitation.

They claimed that, being illiterate and rustic villagers, they had mistakenly pursued proceedings before the revenue authorities for mutation of their names, which concluded with rejection by the Revenue Secretary on 3 March 2022.

They thereafter initiated execution proceedings in 2022, the rejection of which was challenged in a pending Civil Revision Application.

The applicants also relied on the fact that the opponent’s Second Appeal No. 200 of 2017 against the same judgment was pending and that they had entered appearance through counsel in that proceeding in 2017.

Whether the applicants had shown “sufficient cause” under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963, for condoning the delay of 3,199 days in filing the Second Appeal?

Whether the period spent by the applicants before the revenue authorities and in execution proceedings could be excluded under Section 14 of the Limitation Act, 1963, as time spent bona fide prosecuting a proceeding before a wrong forum?

Whether the pendency of the opponent’s Second Appeal against the same judgment justified condonation of the applicants’ delay, possibly subject to costs?

The Court applied Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963, under which delay may be condoned only upon proof of sufficient cause, and Section 14, which permits exclusion of time spent prosecuting, with due diligence and in good faith, a civil proceeding concerning the same matter or relief before a court unable to entertain it due to lack of jurisdiction or a similar defect.

Relying on K.B. Lal (Krishna Bahadur Lal) v. Gyanendra Pratap, 2024 (4) Scale 759, Pathapati Subba Reddy (D) by LRs v. Special Deputy Collector (LA), 2024 INSC 286, Basawaraj v. Special Land Acquisition Officer, (2013) 14 SCC 81, and Shivamma (Dead) by LRs v. Karnataka Housing Board, 2025 INSC 1104, the Court held that although Section 5 must receive a liberal, justice-oriented construction, such discretion is unavailable where the delay is gross, unexplained, negligent, lacking in bona fides, or unsupported by due diligence.

The Court also relied on Babubhai Ushmanbhai Mandli v. Mehbubbhai Rasulbhai Mandli, Second Appeal No. 236 of 2018, for the principle that revenue proceedings concerning mutation are not equivalent to civil proceedings for determining title and cannot ordinarily attract Section 14.

The Court held that the applicants had knowledge of the appellate judgment by 2017, particularly because they appeared through counsel in the opponent’s Second Appeal filed that year; they could therefore have filed their own Second Appeal or cross-appeal at that stage, but offered no explanation for failing to do so.

Their pursuit of mutation before the revenue authorities was not a bona fide prosecution of the same civil remedy before a court lacking jurisdiction. The revenue proceedings concerned mutation of entries, whereas the proposed Second Appeal challenged the appellate judgment and decree; moreover, the revenue claim was decided on merits rather than rejected for want of jurisdiction or maintainability.

Consequently, Section 14 was inapplicable.

The applicants’ reliance on Purni Devi v. Babu Ram, AIR 2024 SC Supp 1933, was distinguished because that case involved execution proceedings pursued before a wrong forum after finality of the decree, unlike the present case.

Given the unexplained and inordinate delay of over eight and a half years, the applicants’ conscious choice to pursue other remedies, and their lack of due diligence, the pendency of the opponent’s Second Appeal and willingness to pay costs did not constitute sufficient cause.

The application for condonation of delay was accordingly dismissed in limine, without costs.

The Registry was directed to refuse registration of the Second Appeal and any stay application filed with it.