Chhattisgarh HC Upholds Village Kotwar Appointment, Rejects Cousin’s Challenge to Gram Sabha Resolution

The petitioner’s father had served as Village Kotwar of Kusma; after his death, the petitioner was a minor and respondent No. 1’s father, Pitamber Das, was appointed. Following Pitamber Das’s resignation, the Tahsildar appointed respondent No. 1 as Kotwar on 15 January 2020, relying in part on a Gram Sabha resolution dated 5 October 2019.

The SDO set aside the appointment, finding procedural defects in the resolution and notice; the Commissioner affirmed and directed a fresh appointment process. On revision, the Board of Revenue set aside the Commissioner’s order and restored the Tahsildar’s appointment order. The petitioner challenged the Board’s decision, alleging that the meeting and resolution were invalid and that the public notice was inadequate.

Appointment of a Village Kotwar is governed by Section 230 of the Chhattisgarh Land Revenue Code, 1959, and the Rules framed under it; any preference for a near relative of an erstwhile Kotwar does not create an absolute or vested right to appointment.

In judicial review under Articles 226 and 227, the High Court does not ordinarily reappreciate evidence or substitute its factual conclusions for those of the competent authority; interference is warranted for grounds such as jurisdictional error, patent illegality, perversity, arbitrariness, or violation of natural justice (Union of India v. P. Gunasekaran, (2015) 2 SCC 610; Rajendra Diwan v. Pradeep Kumar Ranibala, (2019) 20 SCC 143; Municipal Corporation of Greater Mumbai v. Vivek V. Gawde, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 3722).

The Court held that the Board had considered the Gram Sabha resolution and the Tahsildar’s appointment proceedings and had found insufficient grounds to invalidate them.

The prior resolution, its timing relative to the notice and application, and the challenge to publication did not, in the Court’s view, establish that the appointment was necessarily void; the disputed affidavits concerning attendance and signatures likewise did not demonstrate an incontrovertible illegality warranting writ interference. Applying the limits on judicial review, the Court declined to substitute its assessment for that of the Board. It also rejected the petitioner’s claim to appointment as a vested right, noting that the rules allowed no absolute entitlement and that respondent No. 1 was also the son of a person who had served as Kotwar.

The writ petition was dismissed, and the Board’s order dated 7 November 2022—and respondent No. 1’s appointment under the Tahsildar’s order dated 15 January 2020—was left undisturbed. The Court clarified that the decision conferred no independent or vested right to appointment on either party; there was no order as to costs.