Chief Medical Officer lacks jurisdiction to cancel clinical establishment registration; such power vests solely in District Registering Authority.

The petitioners, operators of a hospital with a provisional registration, challenged two orders passed by the Chief Medical Officer (CMO): a sealing order dated March 10, 2026, and a cancellation of registration order dated March 18, 2026

The petitioners contended that under the Clinical Establishments (Registration and Regulation) Act, 2010, the CMO lacks the statutory authority to cancel registrations, as that power is vested solely in the "District Registering Authority"

The State argued that Section 10(2) of the Act and Rule 13 of the U.P. Rules, 2016, empower the CMO to act as the authority for provisional registrations, and cited a previous Division Bench ruling in Medaxis Hospital v. State of U.P. to support the CMO’s jurisdiction

1. Whether the Chief Medical Officer (CMO) constitutes the "Authority" empowered to cancel a clinical establishment's registration under Section 32 of the Clinical Establishments Act, 2010

2. Whether a writ petition is maintainable despite the existence of an alternative remedy when the impugned order is passed without jurisdiction

The court applied Section 2(a) of the Clinical Establishments Act, 2010, which defines "authority" as the district registering authority set up under Section 10

Section 10(1) prescribes the composition of this Authority, consisting of the District Collector (Chairperson), District Health Officer (Convenor), and three appointed members

Section 10(2) creates a limited exception, allowing the CMO to exercise powers of the authority specifically for the "purposes of provisional registration" under Section 14

Rule 14(a) of the Uttar Pradesh Clinical Establishments Rules, 2016, explicitly lists the cancellation of registration as a function of the multi-member Authority

The court relied on Whirlpool Corporation v. Registrar of Trademarks (1998) to hold that an alternative remedy does not bar writ jurisdiction where the authority acted without jurisdiction

The court reasoned that while Section 10(2) allows the CMO to process applications for provisional registration, this limited empowerment does not equate the CMO to the "Authority" for the purpose of cancellation under Section 32

The definition in Section 2(a) and the composition mandated by Section 10(1) clearly indicate that the Authority is a multi-member committee

The court disagreed with the interpretation in paragraph 14 of Medaxis Hospital, clarifying that nowhere in the Act is the CMO equated to the Authority for cancellation

Consequently, the CMO’s unilateral order was held to be without jurisdiction

The court noted a procedural lapse: Section 32(2) requires a mandatory three-month notice period before cancellation, which was not issued by the Authority in this case

The court quashed the sealing order dated March 10, 2026, and the cancellation order dated March 18, 2026. The writ petition was allowed, and the court directed that any future cancellation proceedings must be initiated by the statutory Authority by issuing a three-month notice as prescribed under Section 32(2) of the Act