CIDCO, acting as State Government’s agent, is neither a necessary nor proper party in land acquisition appeals.

The appeals arose from land-acquisition proceedings concerning lands at Village Bokadvira, Taluka Uran, District Raigad, acquired in 1986–1989 for the New Bombay Project and subsequently handed over to CIDCO for development of Navi Mumbai

Following an application under Section 28A of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, the Reference Court enhanced compensation to Rs. 1,124 per square metre, together with statutory benefits, by judgment dated 24 March 2021; the State challenged that judgment in the present First Appeals

CIDCO sought impleadment as a respondent, contending that it was responsible for the financial burden of enhanced compensation under Government Resolutions, had developed the acquired lands, and possessed relevant material concerning valuation

The claimants opposed impleadment, arguing that CIDCO functioned only as an agent of the State Government under Section 113(3A) of the Maharashtra Regional and Town Planning Act, 1966, and was neither a “person interested” nor an entity entitled to participate under Section 50 of the Land Acquisition Act

1. Whether CIDCO was a necessary or proper party entitled to be impleaded as a respondent in the First Appeals merely because it allegedly bore the financial burden of enhanced compensation and had developed the acquired lands?

2. Whether CIDCO could invoke the right of participation under Section 50(2) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, as the authority or company at whose cost the acquisition was undertaken?

3. Whether the statutory scheme under Sections 113(3A), 113A, 118 and 119 of the Maharashtra Regional and Town Planning Act, 1966 made CIDCO the acquiring body or merely an agent of the State Government?

Under Section 113(3A) of the Maharashtra Regional and Town Planning Act, 1966, a corporation appointed as New Town Development Authority performs development and disposal functions as an agent of the State Government; Section 113A separately provides that the State Government acquires the land and vests it in the Authority

Sections 118 and 119 further show that the Authority’s powers of disposal and development remain subject to State Government directions

Under Sections 3(b) and 50 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, a “person interested” is one claiming an interest in compensation, while a local authority or company may participate under Section 50(2) only where the acquisition is undertaken at its cost

The Court followed Percival Joseph Pareira v. Special Land Acquisition Officer and its affirmation by the Division Bench in City and Industrial Development Corporation v. Percival Joseph Pareira, which held that CIDCO acts as the State Government’s agent, that acquisition is at the State’s cost, and that Section 50 does not apply to CIDCO

The principles in Neyvely Lignite Corporation Ltd. v. Special Tahsildar, Delhi Development Authority v. Bhola Nath Sharma, Himalayan Tiles and Marble (P) Ltd. v. Francis Victor Coutinho and U.P. Awas Evam Vikas Parishad v. Gyan Devi—recognising participation rights of a true beneficiary or entity liable for acquisition costs—were accepted but held inapplicable because CIDCO did not possess that statutory status under the governing scheme

The Court held that CIDCO’s alleged financial exposure, including payment of enhanced compensation, interest, development expenditure and implementation of the 12.5% scheme, did not by itself confer a statutory right of impleadment

The MRTP Act distinguishes between acquisition by the State Government and subsequent development by CIDCO: the State acquires the land under Section 113A, while CIDCO develops and disposes of it as the Government’s agent under Section 113(3A)

The acquisition notifications and the binding decision in Percival Joseph Pareira established that the acquisition was at the cost of the State Government, not of any fund controlled or managed by CIDCO

Consequently, CIDCO could not rely on Section 50(2), and its possession of potentially relevant valuation material did not independently make it a proper party

The Supreme Court decisions relied upon by CIDCO presupposed that the proposed party was the beneficiary for whose benefit the acquisition was made or was statutorily liable for the acquisition cost; that foundational condition was absent here

Interim Application Nos. 5184 and 5185 of 2026 seeking CIDCO’s impleadment were accordingly rejected, with no order as to costs