Civil proceedings under the Act of 1978 cannot be invoked by parties to a voluntary alienation made after the non-alienation period.

The original vendor was granted land in 1977, with a grant certificate issued in 1981 under Schedule E of the Land Revenue Code, prohibiting alienation for 15 years.

In 1997, after the 15-year period expired, the original grantee’s sons (Respondents 4 and 5) participated in the first transfer of the land.

The appellant purchased the land in 2003.

In 2006-07, approximately 9 years after the first sale, Respondents 4 and 5—who were parties to the 1997 sale deed—initiated proceedings to annul the sale under Section 4 of the Karnataka Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prohibition of Transfer of Certain Lands) Act, 1978 (“the Act”).

The lower authorities and the High Court concurrently invalidated the sale, citing lack of prior government permission.

1. Whether the proceedings to annul the sale under the Act of 1978 were maintainable when initiated by the very individuals who were parties to the alienation after the non-alienation period had expired.

2. Whether the delay of 9 years in initiating proceedings was fatal given the specific conduct of the respondents.

Section 4 of the Karnataka Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prohibition of Transfer of Certain Lands) Act, 1978, which declares transfers of granted lands without prior Government permission as null and void.

The principle of "reasonable time" for initiating proceedings as established in Shakuntala v. State of Karnataka and Vivek M. Hinduja v. M. Ashwatha.

Satyan v. Deputy Commissioner, which held that while an 8-year delay is generally not fatal in beneficial legislation, the facts of each case must be scrutinized.

The court distinguished this case from precedents like Satyan based on the "peculiar facts" of the litigants' conduct.

Respondents 4 and 5 (the sons of the grantee) were not "unaware" legal representatives; they were adults (aged 35 and 25) who actively participated in the 1997 sale after the 15-year restrictive period had lapsed.

The court reasoned that allowed such parties to challenge their own voluntary alienation after a 9-year delay would be an improper invocation of the Act, especially since this was not a case of the village community or a third party reporting an illegal transfer.

The Supreme Court allowed the appeal and set aside the orders of the lower authorities and the High Court; the impugned orders annulling the sale were quashed.