Claim of Juvenility May Be Raised at Any Stage and Conviction Requires Evidence of Specific Intent Under Section 363A IPC

The appellants were accused of forcibly taking the informant’s minor son to Delhi on 10.10.2000 under the pretext of employment. The victim returned on his own after three years.

A complaint was filed in 2001, resulting in a trial where the appellants were convicted by the Additional District and Sessions Judge, Jamui, on 14.06.2010 for offences under Sections 363A (Kidnapping for begging), 120B (Criminal Conspiracy), and 201 (Disappearance of evidence) of the IPC.

During the statement recorded under Section 313 Cr.P.C. in 2010, the ages of the appellants were noted as 23, 26, and 22, indicating they were below 18 years (and specifically below 16) at the time of the offence in 2000.

The claim of juvenility was raised for the first time during the appeal.

The court applied Section 7-A of the Juvenile Justice Act, 2000 (as amended in 2006), which allows a claim of juvenility to be raised at any stage, even after final disposal.

It relied on Section 20 of the Act, which mandates that for pending cases, if a juvenile is found to have committed an offence, the court must forward them to the Juvenile Justice Board for sentencing instead of passing a regular sentence.

On the substantive charge, the court applied Section 363A of the IPC, requiring proof of kidnapping specifically for the purpose of begging.

The principle from S. Varadarajan v. State of Madras (AIR 1965 SC 942), which distinguishes "taking" from a minor voluntarily accompanying an accused.

The Court first determined that the appellants were juveniles on the date of the offence based on trial records and Section 313 statements.

Applying the precedents of Satya Deo @ Bhoorey v. State of U.P. and Hansraj v. State of U.P., the Court held that the right to claim juvenility is an extension of Article 21 and must be recognized at any stage.

Moving to the merits, the Court found that for a conviction under Section 363A, the prosecution must prove the minor was taken specifically for begging.

The evidence showed the victim accompanied the appellants for work, not begging, and the informant was aware of his departure.

Since there was no evidence of inducement, forced alms-seeking, or maiming, the prosecution failed to establish the "taking" or the criminal "intent" required under Sections 363A and 120B.

Furthermore, it held that the prosecution failed to prove the essential ingredients of Sections 363A, 120B, and 201 of the IPC beyond a reasonable doubt.

The Court set aside the judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated 14.06.2010, acquitted the appellants of all charges, and discharged them from their bail bonds.