Cognizance under Section 295-A IPC without prior Section 196 sanction is legally unsustainable.

The petitioner sought quashing of the FIR dated 8 January 2016, the consequential charge-sheet, and the order dated 11 January 2016 by which the JMFC, Jabalpur, took cognizance in RCT No. 425/2016 for offences under Sections 294, 506 and 295-A of the IPC.

The prosecution alleged that, while the complainant was offering prayers at a temple, the petitioner abused him, objected to the ringing of the temple bell and entry of outsiders, threatened to remove the idol of Lord Shankar, and issued threats of serious consequences.

The petitioner contended that cognizance of the Section 295-A offence was barred in the absence of previous governmental sanction under Section 196(1)(a) of the CrPC.

He also relied on the petitioner’s age, the pendency of the prosecution since 2016, and the examination of only two witnesses to assert violation of the constitutional right to speedy trial under Article 21.

The State opposed complete quashing, arguing that the allegations disclosed cognizable offences and that the factual merits should be determined by the trial Court.

1. Whether cognizance of the offence under Section 295-A IPC was invalid for want of previous sanction under Section 196(1)(a) CrPC?

2. Whether the FIR, charge-sheet, and criminal proceedings for Sections 294 and 506 IPC were liable to be quashed on the basis of disputed facts, alleged mala fides, or absence of the ingredients of Section 295-A IPC?

3. Whether the delay in concluding the trial violated the petitioner’s right to speedy trial under Article 21 so as to warrant quashing of the entire prosecution?

Section 196(1)(a) CrPC prohibits any Court from taking cognizance of an offence punishable under Section 295-A IPC without the previous sanction of the Central or State Government; the requirement is mandatory and jurisdictional.

Sections 294 and 506 IPC do not fall within the scope of Section 196 CrPC and do not require such sanction.

The High Court may intervene where continuation of proceedings is legally impermissible, but disputed factual questions and allegations of mala fides ordinarily require adjudication by the trial Court.

The constitutional right to speedy trial under Article 21, as explained in Abdul Rehman Antulay v. R.S. Nayak , (1992) 1 SCC 225, requires expeditious criminal proceedings; however, delay does not automatically mandate termination of a prosecution in every case.

The petition was filed under Section 528 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023.

The Court found that Section 196(1)(a) CrPC expressly covers Section 295-A IPC and creates an absolute restriction on cognizance without prior sanction.

Since the State did not dispute that no sanction had been obtained before filing the charge-sheet or before cognizance was taken on 11 January 2016, the Magistrate’s cognizance of the Section 295-A offence was without jurisdiction and could not stand.

However, the same defect did not affect the offences under Sections 294 and 506 IPC, which are outside Section 196 CrPC.

Whether the allegations ultimately establish those offences, or whether the prosecution was motivated by mala fides, involved disputed factual matters unsuitable for determination in the quashing jurisdiction.

Although the Court acknowledged that the trial had remained pending for nearly ten years and that only two witnesses had been examined despite repeated opportunities, it considered that the appropriate remedy was an expedited trial rather than termination of the remaining prosecution, particularly because evidence had already commenced and the surviving offences were comparatively limited in nature.

The order dated 11 January 2016 taking cognizance, and all consequential proceedings insofar as they related to Section 295-A IPC, were quashed for want of previous sanction under Section 196(1)(a) CrPC.

The proceedings under Sections 294 and 506 IPC were permitted to continue.

The trial Court was directed to make every endeavour to conclude the trial preferably within six months of receiving the certified copy of the order and to avoid unnecessary adjournments.

The petitioner was left at liberty to raise all other permissible defences before the trial Court.