Compassionate Appointment Cannot Be Claimed After Substantial Lapse of Time Following Attainment of Majority

The petitioner’s father, a Class-IV Sweeper at Referral Hospital, Makdampur, died in harness on May 3, 2005.

At the time, the petitioner was approximately 10 years old.

Upon attaining majority in 2015, the petitioner applied for compassionate appointment on February 5, 2016.

The Compassionate Appointment Committee rejected the application on October 14, 2016, citing a delay of 11 years, which exceeded the government-prescribed five-year limit for such applications.

1. Whether the petitioner is entitled to compassionate appointment after attaining majority when the application was filed 11 years after the death of the government employee.

2. Whether the five-year limitation period for applying for compassionate appointment remains applicable in cases where the dependent was a minor at the time of the employee's death.

The court applied the principle that compassionate appointment is not a vested right or an alternative mode of recruitment but a welfare measure intended to provide immediate financial relief to a family in distress.

It relied on Umesh Kumar Nagpal v. State of Haryana (1994), which held that such employment cannot be granted after a lapse of a reasonable period specified in the rules.

It further cited Jagdish Prasad v. State of Bihar (1996), establishing that a dependent who was a minor at the time of death cannot claim appointment long after attaining majority if the crisis has passed.

Local Administration Department v. M. Selvanayagam @ Kumaravelu (2011), emphasizing that appointments made many years after the death conflict with Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution.

The court reasoned that the primary objective of compassionate appointment is to mitigate the "unexpected immediate hardship" caused by the death of a breadwinner.

Applying the precedents of the Supreme Court, the High Court found that the lapse of 11 years signifies that the immediate financial crisis following the death had dissipated.

The court noted that the petitioner failed to challenge the specific order dated October 14, 2016, which had rejected his claim based on the statutory five-year limitation period.

Consequently, the court held that allowing an appointment so long after the fact would bypass standard recruitment rules and violate constitutional principles.

The writ petition was accordingly rejected, and all pending applications were disposed of.