Compassionate appointment cannot be claimed as a vested right absent an employer’s policy.

The respondent-plaintiff’s husband, Harshadbhai Mohanbhai Rana, was employed as a driver with the appellant-bank and died in harness on 20 February 1984.

The deceased’s family received the applicable service benefits.

The plaintiff issued a legal notice dated 1 January 1990 seeking compassionate appointment on the basis that similar appointments had been granted to other deceased employees’ family members; the bank replied that it had no policy providing compassionate appointment.

The plaintiff initially instituted a suit before the Civil Court at Bharuch on 23 April 1990, which was returned for presentation before the competent court.

She thereafter instituted Regular Civil Suit No. 1608 of 1992 before the Civil Court, Vadodara, seeking a mandatory direction for appointment.

The Trial Court decreed the suit, holding that the plaintiff was entitled to compassionate appointment because appointments had allegedly been granted in similar cases.

The First Appellate Court affirmed the decree and directed the bank to provide appointment to the plaintiff or, if major, to her son.

The bank preferred the present second appeal under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908.

1. Whether the lower Appellate Court erred in directing the bank to offer compassionate appointment in the absence of an existing policy providing for such appointment on the date of the cause of action.

2. Whether the lower Appellate Court erred in granting relief when the plaintiff had not made a formal application for compassionate appointment.

3. Whether the lower Appellate Court could direct appointment of the plaintiff’s son, who had neither claimed such relief nor had his eligibility been determined.

4. Whether the plaintiff’s suit for mandatory injunction was barred by limitation under Article 113 of the Limitation Act, 1963.

The Court applied Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, under which interference with concurrent findings is ordinarily restricted but is permissible where the findings are perverse, grossly erroneous, or contrary to the evidence or law.

Section 3 of the Limitation Act, 1963 imposes a duty on the Court to dismiss a time-barred suit even where limitation has not been pleaded.

Article 113 prescribes a three-year limitation period for suits for which no specific period is provided, commencing when the right to sue accrues.

The Court applied the principle that compassionate appointment is not a vested or indefeasible right and can be claimed only under an applicable statutory rule or employer policy; its purpose is to provide immediate financial assistance to the family of an employee who dies in service.

In this regard, the Court relied on Canara Bank v. Ajithkumar G.K., AIR 2025 SC 1232.

The Court also relied on Tharammel Peethambaran v. T. Ushakrishnan, AIR 2026 SC 938 : 2026 INSC 134, concerning correction of perverse findings in a second appeal.

The Court found that the plaintiff had failed to establish any express bank policy conferring a right to compassionate appointment.

Exhibits 33 and 34 did not prove that the persons relied upon had actually received compassionate appointments: one case involved only a recommendation for possible daily-wage employment, while the other was an ordinary appointment order without any reference to compassionate grounds.

The bank’s resolution at Exhibit 35 merely provided that applications relating to deaths occurring after the resolution, or applications pending in accordance with bank norms, could be considered; it did not create an enforceable right in the plaintiff, whose husband had died in 1984 and who had not submitted a formal application.

Consequently, the plaintiff had no legal right capable of enforcement through a mandatory injunction, and the concurrent findings were held to be perverse and contrary to the evidence.

The Appellate Court further exceeded the pleadings and its jurisdiction by directing appointment of the plaintiff’s son, who had neither sought the relief nor had his eligibility been assessed.

Independently, the Court held that the right to seek appointment, if any, accrued upon the husband’s death on 20 February 1984.

Since the suit was governed by the three-year residuary limitation period under Article 113, the suit filed in 1992 was time-barred; the subsequent legal notice could not postpone accrual of the cause of action.

It held that compassionate appointment could not be claimed in the absence of an applicable policy, that the plaintiff had not established any enforceable right or valid application, and that the direction to appoint her son was beyond the pleadings and jurisdiction of the Appellate Court.

The Court additionally held that the suit was barred by limitation under Article 113 of the Limitation Act, 1963.

The second appeal was allowed; the judgments and decrees dated 18 January 2003 and 26 July 2006 were quashed and set aside, Regular Civil Suit No. 1608 of 1992 was dismissed, and no order as to costs was made.