Compassionate Appointment Cannot Be Claimed Beyond Governing Policy or Following Removal from Service

The Appellant’s father, an employee of SECL, went missing on July 25, 2003.

On September 25, 2006, the employer removed him from service for unauthorized absence.

The Appellant first applied for compassionate appointment in 2009.

On December 17, 2013, a Civil Court declared the father civilly dead, noting he had been missing since 2004.

Following a 2017 writ petition directing a decision, SECL rejected the claim on October 18, 2019, stating that compassionate appointment based on "civil death" had been deleted from the prevailing policy and that the removal from service preceded the decree of civil death.

The learned Single Judge dismissed the Appellant's writ petition on March 20, 2026, upholding the policy change.

1. Whether the rejection of the claim for compassionate appointment was valid given that the employee was removed from service prior to the declaration of civil death.

2. Whether the Appellant has a vested right to compassionate appointment despite changes in the employer's governing policy.

The Court applied the principle that compassionate appointment is not a standard source of recruitment or a matter of right, but a benefit governed strictly by the scheme or policy prevailing at the time of consideration.

It emphasized the limited scope of interference in intra-court appeals, whereby the appellate court will not substitute its view unless the lower court’s findings are perverse or patently illegal.

The court also noted the contractual nature of the National Coal Wage Agreement (NCWA) regarding "death-in-harness" benefits.

The Court observed that SECL rejected the claim because the criteria for "civil death" was removed from their recruitment policy and the employee was technically removed from service before he was legally declared dead.

The Court found the Appellant's argument—that the presumption of death should relate back to 2004 (making the 2006 removal void)—insufficient to override the existing policy.

The bench reasoned that because compassionate appointment is a humanitarian exception rather than a right, the employer is legally bound to act only in accordance with the specific terms of the scheme active during the decision-making process.

Since the Appellant failed to challenge the validity of the policy change itself, the High Court determined there was no basis to interfere with the Single Judge’s refusal to grant relief.

It held that compassionate appointment must align with the prevailing policy, and since the Appellant’s case fell outside the current scheme and involved a prior lawful removal from service, no direction for appointment could be issued.

Pending applications were disposed of without costs.