Compassionate appointment claims filed after an unreasonable delay are liable to rejection.

The respondent’s father, a Village Assistant, died in harness on 13 November 1997, when the respondent was about seven years old.

The respondent’s mother applied for compassionate appointment on 11 May 1998; that application was rejected on 5 June 1998 because of a ban on such appointments, and she did not pursue the matter after the ban was lifted.

The respondent applied afresh on 5 October 2015, approximately 17 years after his father’s death.

The application was rejected as time-barred under the applicable three-year period.

The respondent challenged the rejection in a writ petition, which the Single Judge allowed on 15 March 2023. The State appealed.

Whether the respondent’s application for compassionate appointment, submitted approximately 17 years after his father’s death, could be entertained under the scheme.

Whether the Single Judge’s order allowing the writ petition should be set aside in light of the delay and the governing principles of compassionate appointment.

Compassionate appointment is an exception to the general rule of public recruitment, not a right, and must be governed by the State’s applicable policy and eligibility criteria.

Public appointments remain subject to Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution.

Relying on Director of Treasuries, Karnataka v. Somyashree, 2021 INSC 472, the Court reiterated that an applicant has no right to compassionate appointment, that the State’s policy and eligibility norms must be satisfied, and that the norms prevailing when the application is considered govern the claim.

The Court also held that undue delay may justify rejection because the scheme addresses immediate financial hardship; compassionate appointment is not hereditary or an entitlement to one appointment per family.

The respondent’s father died when the respondent was a minor, and the respondent’s fresh application was made about 17 years later.

The earlier application by his mother had been rejected, and she did not pursue it after the ban was lifted.

Applying the principles in Somyashree and the purpose of the scheme, the Court treated the substantial delay as a valid ground for rejection: the financial hardship arising from the employee’s death could not be presumed to persist indefinitely.

It further reasoned that granting appointment after such a lapse would extend the scheme beyond its purpose and conflict with the constitutional framework for public employment.

It set aside the order dated 15 March 2023 and allowed the State’s writ appeal, with no order as to costs; any connected miscellaneous petitions were closed.