Compassionate appointment is a concession for immediate financial distress, not a vested right claimable after substantial delay.

The Respondent’s father, a Lineman with the Petitioner organization, died due to electrocution during the course of employment on August 26, 2003

Following the death, the family received terminal benefits and statutory compensation totaling approximately ₹7,46,539, plus a monthly family pension

The Respondent applied for compassionate appointment on February 10, 2010—roughly six and a half years after the death and five years after attaining majority

The Petitioner rejected the request, citing a two-year limitation period under Clause 16(j) and a lack of financial indigence under Clause 16(c) of the Delhi Vidyut Board Scheme for Compassionate Appointments, 1999

The Industrial Tribunal, via an Award dated March 22, 2014, ruled in favor of the Respondent, directing the Petitioner to consider the appointment on merits

The Petitioner challenged this Award via the present writ petition.

1. Whether the impugned Award is contrary to the settled law that compassionate appointment is not a vested right but an exception or concession to provide immediate financial relief.

2. Whether the impugned Award suffers from perversity, non-application of mind, or patent illegality warranting interference under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.

The Court primarily applied the principles governing compassionate appointment as an exception to Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution

It relied heavily on the precedent in Canara Bank v. Ajithkumar G.K. (2025), which establishes that compassionate appointment is a concession, not a vested right, and requires strict adherence to the employer’s policy regarding indigence, immediate financial hardship, and timely application

The Court also applied the "Delhi Vidyut Board Scheme for Compassionate Appointments, 1999," specifically Clause 5(a) (indigence), Clause 7 (5% quota/vacancy), and Clause 16(j) (two-year limitation period)

Furthermore, it observed the principle from Beg Raj Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh (2003) that relief may be denied if the lapse of time renders it redundant

The Court found the Tribunal’s Award perverse for failing to evaluate the mandatory conditions of the Scheme. Firstly, the Respondent’s family received substantial terminal benefits which were preserved until 2012, indicating an absence of the "immediate financial crisis" required by Clause 5(a)

Secondly, the Respondent admitted to gainful intermittent employment, and the family received a continuous pension, negating the plea of persistent indigence.

Regarding procedural compliance, the Court noted a fatal delay: the claim was raised six and a half years post-death and five years after the Respondent attained majority, violating the two-year limit in Clause 16(j)

The Tribunal’s assumption of "continuous pursuit" was unsupported by documentary evidence

Finally, the Court held that the Tribunal erred in treating the 5% quota as a source of entitlement, as Clause 7 requires the existence of actual vacancies in Group ‘D’ posts, which were non-existent at the material time

The Court concluded that since the family survived for years on terminal benefits and pension, the "immediacy" justifying an exception to public recruitment had vanished

Consequently, the Court set aside the Impugned Award dated March 22, 2014, and allowed the Writ Petition, quashing the direction to consider the Respondent for appointment