Compassionate appointment is unavailable where the employee’s natural death falls outside specified policy contingencies.

The petitioner’s father died while in service of the respondent electricity company.

The petitioner sought compassionate appointment under the company’s Compassionate Appointment Policy, 2013 (Revised).

His application was rejected by order dated 17 July 2015 on the ground that his father had died a natural death in the ordinary course, and not due to an accident or other specified contingency arising during employment.

The petitioner challenged the rejection under Article 226 of the Constitution, contending that Clause 1.1 of the Policy permitted compassionate appointment upon the death of an eligible employee while in service.

The respondent maintained that the Policy limited such appointment to cases involving death due to an accident, electrocution, assault by miscreants, or a motor-vehicle accident in the course of employment.

Whether the petitioner was entitled to compassionate appointment merely because his father died while in service, notwithstanding that the death was a natural death and did not result from an accident or other specified employment-related contingency

Whether the rejection order dated 17 July 2015 was contrary to the respondent’s Compassionate Appointment Policy, 2013 (Revised), and liable to be quashed under Article 226 of the Constitution

The Court applied Article 226 of the Constitution of India and the respondent’s Compassionate Appointment Policy, 2013 (Revised), particularly Clause 1.1 read with the eligibility conditions in Clauses 2 and 3.

The governing principle was that compassionate appointment is available only in accordance with the applicable policy and its prescribed conditions; death during service, by itself, does not create an unconditional right to such appointment.

As understood and applied by the Court, the Policy contemplated compassionate appointment in specified cases, including death resulting from an accident, electrocution, assault, or motor-vehicle accident in the course of employment.

The Court found that the petitioner neither pleaded nor produced any material showing that his father’s death resulted from an accident, electrocution, assault, or any other employment-related contingency covered by the Policy.

Since the impugned order recorded that the death was natural and occurred in the ordinary course, the petitioner’s case did not satisfy the Policy’s prescribed conditions.

The Court declined to presume that the death resulted from an incident covered by the Policy in the absence of supporting evidence.

Accordingly, the rejection was held to be consistent with the governing Policy and not arbitrary or illegal so as to warrant interference under Article 226.

The rejection order dated 17 July 2015 was upheld, and the writ petition was dismissed as meritless.