Competent authority must decide the pending representation by a reasoned order within eight weeks, without merits adjudication.

The petitioner, Dr Chandra Deep Yadav, was selected by the Madhya Pradesh Public Service Commission as Assistant Professor (Criminology) and joined Government Madhav Arts and Commerce College, Ujjain, pursuant to the appointment order dated 7 January 2020.

He was performing teaching and academic duties and had also been entrusted with the charge of Head of the Department of Criminology.

After he allegedly complained about absenteeism, negligence in examination duties and indiscipline by a subordinate faculty member, an FIR was registered against him at Police Station Mahila Thana, Ujjain.

By order dated 7 August 2026, described by the petitioner as an administrative arrangement and by the State as a transfer in the exigencies of administration, he was directed to leave his academic assignment at Ujjain and perform non-academic administrative duties at Rewa.

The petitioner challenged that order under Article 226 of the Constitution and sought, inter alia, its quashing, continuation in his teaching duties at Ujjain, and consideration of his representation dated 11 August 2026.

During the proceedings, the State acknowledged that the representation was pending and agreed that it could be directed to be considered by the competent authority.

1. Whether the order dated 7 August 2026 transferring or administratively assigning the petitioner from Ujjain to Rewa was liable to be quashed under Article 226 of the Constitution.

2. Whether the petitioner was entitled to a direction permitting him to continue performing his academic duties as Assistant Professor at Government Madhav Arts and Commerce College, Ujjain.

3. Whether the competent authority should be directed to consider and decide the petitioner’s pending representation dated 11 August 2026 by a reasoned and speaking order within a prescribed time.

The Court exercised its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, which permits issuance of writs, directions and orders for enforcement of legal rights and for judicial review of administrative action.

The Court applied the principle that where a relevant representation against an administrative order is pending before the competent authority, the matter may appropriately be left to that authority for consideration in accordance with law, particularly where the Court is not adjudicating the merits at that stage.

It further directed that the representation be decided through a reasoned and speaking order, while expressly refraining from expressing an opinion on the validity of the impugned administrative order.

No statutory provision or judicial precedent was relied upon in the order beyond the constitutional jurisdiction under Article 226 and these administrative-law principles.

The Court noted that the petitioner had already submitted a detailed representation challenging the order dated 7 August 2026 and raising the alleged illegality of the transfer, the distance between Ujjain and Rewa, the academic consequences of the displacement and the circumstances surrounding the action.

Although the petitioner sought adjudication of the impugned order and continuation at Ujjain, the Court considered that these grievances were already pending before the competent authority.

Since the State confirmed that the representation remained pending, the Court found it appropriate to require administrative consideration rather than examine the merits of the transfer, the FIR, or the competing characterisation of the order as an attachment or transfer.

Accordingly, the Court limited its intervention to ensuring a time-bound, reasoned and speaking decision by the competent authority.

Without expressing any opinion on the merits, it disposed of the writ petition and directed Respondent No. 1 to consider and decide the petitioner’s pending representation dated 11 August 2026 in accordance with law, by passing a reasoned and speaking order within eight weeks from receipt of a certified copy of the judgment.

The reliefs seeking quashing of the administrative order and continuation in the petitioner’s academic post were therefore left open for consideration by the competent authority.