Composite trademarks must be compared as a whole, not dissected, to assess deceptive similarity.

The appellant sued under Sections 134 and 135 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999, alleging infringement and passing off of its registered “SUNAREKA” mark by the respondent’s use of “SWARNIKA” for jewellery. The appellant’s registration application was filed on 9 September 2022 and registration was granted on 28 July 2023; the respondent said she had applied to register “SWARNIKA Gems and Jewels” on 5 June 2023.

The trial court dismissed the appellant’s application for interim injunction under Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 read with Section 151 CPC. The appellant challenged that order in this appeal.

The parties’ shops were on the same street, less than 500 metres apart, and the respondent had started her gold-jewellery business under the “SWARNIKA” name after the appellant’s application for registration.

1. Whether the respondent’s use of “SWARNIKA” for jewellery was prima facie deceptively similar to the appellant’s registered “SUNAREKA” mark and likely to cause confusion or deception among consumers

2. Whether the trial court’s refusal of interim relief involved an improper exercise of discretion warranting appellate interference, having regard to prima facie case, balance of convenience and irreparable injury

Sections 29(1) and 29(2) of the Trade Marks Act, 1999 address infringement through use in the course of trade of an identical or deceptively similar mark, including where the similarity of the marks and identity or similarity of the goods is likely to cause public confusion or association.

Under Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 CPC, interim injunction depends on a prima facie case, balance of convenience and irreparable loss; Section 151 CPC was also invoked in the application.

Competing composite marks must be assessed as a whole, not dissected, and likelihood of confusion is judged from the perspective of an ordinary purchaser with imperfect recollection; the marks need not be compared side by side (*Under Armour Inc. v. Anish Agarwal*, *Amritdhara Pharmacy v. Satya Deo Gupta* and *Parle Products (P) Ltd. v. J.P. & Co., Mysore*).

On appeal from a discretionary interlocutory order, interference is justified where the discretion was exercised arbitrarily, capriciously, perversely or contrary to settled principles; the appellate court may examine relevant facts where necessary (*Wander Ltd. v. Antox India (P) Ltd.* and *Ramakant Ambalal Choksi v. Harish Ambalal Choksi*).

The High Court held that the trial court had impermissibly focused on differences in the spelling of “SUNAREKA” and “SWARNIKA” rather than assessing the marks’ overall impression.

Both parties dealt in jewellery, and their shops were located close to each other, making confusion among ordinary purchasers a relevant risk.

The appellant’s registration application preceded the respondent’s entry into the gold-jewellery business under “SWARNIKA”; the Court considered that chronology, together with the similarity of the marks and goods, sufficient to establish a prima facie case.

It also found the balance of convenience favoured the appellant and that continued use of the mark could cause irreparable loss. The trial court’s refusal of relief therefore warranted appellate interference.

Until disposal of the suit, the respondent was restrained from manufacturing, selling, using, displaying, advertising, importing, exporting or otherwise dealing in “SWARNIKA” or any other trade mark deceptively similar to “SUNAREKA,” either herself or through the specified business representatives and distributors.