Compromise in a non-compoundable Section 307 offence may justify sentence reduction, while conviction remains affirmed.

The appellants were prosecuted before the 3rd Additional Sessions Judge, Bhopal, in Sessions Trial No. 317/2009 for an offence under Sections 307/34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC).

After investigation and trial, the Trial Court convicted them by judgment dated 22 September 2010 and imposed a fine of ₹5,000 on each appellant, along with default stipulations and a sentence of imprisonment.

The appellants challenged the conviction under Section 374(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC).

During the pendency of the appeal, the parties entered into a compromise.

The Registrar (Judicial-II), pursuant to the High Court’s order dated 6 January 2026, recorded the parties’ statements and verified that the compromise was voluntary, genuine, and free from threat, inducement, or coercion.

The appellants did not challenge the conviction on merits and sought reduction of their custodial sentence to the period already undergone, relying on the compromise and their respective periods of incarceration.

1. Whether the conviction of the appellants under Sections 307/34 IPC was sustainable on the evidence on record?

2. Whether the compromise between the parties could be accepted or otherwise taken into account, notwithstanding that the offence under Section 307 IPC is non-compoundable under Section 320 CrPC?

3. Whether, in view of the compromise and the period of custody already undergone, the substantive sentence could be reduced to the period already undergone while maintaining the conviction?

The Court exercised appellate jurisdiction under Section 374(2) CrPC and considered the conviction under Sections 307/34 IPC.

Since an offence under Section 307 IPC is non-compoundable under Section 320 CrPC, the compromise could not be used to formally compound or set aside the offence.

However, relying on Ishwar Singh v. State of Madhya Pradesh, AIR 2009 SC 675, the Court held that a compromise is a relevant circumstance while determining the substantive sentence, even where the offence is non-compoundable.

Following Unnikrishnan alias Unnikuttan v. State of Kerala, AIR 2017 SC 1745, and Murali v. State, (2021) 1 SCC 726, the Court recognised that, in appropriate cases, an amicable settlement may justify reducing the sentence to the period already undergone while maintaining the conviction.

The Court also applied the settled principle that a compromise cannot override the statutory bar on compounding but may be considered in the interests of justice, social harmony, and sentencing discretion.

The High Court independently examined the Trial Court’s judgment and the prosecution evidence, finding that the conviction was supported by cogent and reliable oral and documentary evidence and was not perverse, illegal, or otherwise infirm.

Accordingly, the conviction under Sections 307/34 IPC was affirmed.

Although the parties had voluntarily settled the dispute, the Court held that the settlement could not result in compounding the Section 307 IPC offence because of the statutory restriction under Section 320 CrPC.

Nevertheless, applying the principles in Ishwar Singh, Unnikrishnan, and Murali, the Court treated the compromise, the complainant’s lack of objection, the nature of the accusation, and the periods of incarceration already undergone by the appellants as relevant mitigating circumstances for sentencing.

It therefore concluded that continued incarceration would serve no useful purpose and that the ends of justice would be met by reducing the custodial sentence to the period already undergone.

The appellants’ conviction under Sections 307/34 IPC was affirmed, and the compromise was not treated as compounding the non-compoundable offence.

However, the sentence of imprisonment was reduced to the period already undergone by each appellant.

The fine of ₹5,000 imposed on each appellant was maintained and, if unpaid, was required to be deposited within two months; failure to pay would attract the Trial Court’s default sentence.

As the appellants were on bail, their bail bonds were discharged.