Concurrent Findings of Fact and Ineffective Plea of Adverse Possession Bar Interference in Second Appeal

The plaintiffs (Suranas) filed a suit for eviction, recovery of arrears of rent, and mesne profits regarding a shop in 'Surana Bhawan', Durg.

They claimed ownership via a 1966 partition deed and alleged a landlord-tenant relationship with a monthly rent of ₹100/-.

The original defendant (Dwarka Prasad Soni) denied the tenancy, claiming ownership through an unregistered agreement to sell dated 10.05.1972 (Ex. D/12) for ₹9,051/-, asserting protection under Section 53-A of the Transfer of Property Act and, alternatively, title by adverse possession.

After the Trial Court decreed the suit in favor of the plaintiffs and dismissed the defendants' counter-claim, both parties appealed.

The First Appellate Court affirmed the eviction but modified the rent/mesne profits to ₹21/- per month.

The defendants approached the High Court in a Second Appeal.

1. Whether the defendants established ownership or a right to possession based on the 1972 Agreement to Sell (Ex. D/12) and the presumption under Section 90 of the Evidence Act.

2. Whether the defendants perfected their title through adverse possession.

3. Whether the concurrent findings of the lower courts involving appreciation of evidence give rise to a "substantial question of law" under Section 100 of the CPC.

The Court applied Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure (CPC), 1908, which limits the High Court’s jurisdiction in second appeals to "substantial questions of law" and prohibits interference with concurrent findings of fact unless they are perverse or de hors the pleadings.

It relied on the principle from State of Rajasthan v. Shiv Dayal (2019) 8 SCC 637 regarding the narrow scope of interference in second appeals.

Additionally, the court applied Section 53-A of the Transfer of Property Act regarding part performance.

Section 90 of the Evidence Act concerning the presumption of ancient documents.

Section 116 of the Evidence Act regarding the estoppel of a tenant from denying the landlord's title.

The Court observed that both lower courts concurrently found the plaintiffs to be the lawful owners based on the 1966 registered partition deed.

The defendants' reliance on the 1972 Agreement to Sell (Ex. D/12) was rejected because an agreement to sell does not transfer ownership.

The handwriting expert's testimony was deemed inconclusive as she compared signatures against a photocopy, not the original document.

Regarding adverse possession, the Court reasoned that since the defendants entered via a permissive arrangement (tenancy), their possession could not ripen into adverse possession without a clear, hostile assertion of title known to the true owner.

Furthermore, evidence such as electricity and property tax records remained in the plaintiffs' names.

The Court concluded that the challenges raised by the appellants were essentially factual disputes involving the re-appreciation of evidence, which does not constitute a "substantial question of law" required to invoke Section 100 of the CPC.

It held that the plaintiffs are the rightful owners and the defendants are merely tenants.

The Court ordered the defendants to deliver vacant possession of the suit shop to the plaintiffs within three months.

The counter-claims for declaration of ownership and permanent injunction were dismissed.