Concurrent findings of fact cannot be disturbed in second appeal absent perversity or a substantial question of law.

The plaintiffs instituted Regular Civil Suit No. 56 of 2007 before the Principal Senior Civil Judge, Vijapur, seeking a declaration that the suit property was ancestral property and that they were entitled to a one-third share therein.

The defendants contested the claim and asserted that their predecessor had acquired the property by paying the requisite amount and through tenancy rights.

The Trial Court held that the plaintiffs failed to prove the ancestral character of the property, the claimed one-third share, and limitation; it accepted the defendants’ case regarding acquisition of the property and dismissed the suit on 1 July 2014.

The plaintiffs’ first appeal, Regular Civil Appeal No. 21 of 2018, was dismissed by the 6th Additional District Judge, Mehsana, on 8 June 2026, resulting in the present second appeal under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (“CPC”).

The plaintiffs principally relied on an agreement marked Exhibit 56 and certain revenue proceedings and entries to establish their predecessor’s title.

Whether the plaintiffs proved that the suit property was ancestral property and that they were entitled to a one-third share therein?

Whether the concurrent findings of the courts below disclosed a substantial question of law warranting interference under Section 100 CPC?

Whether mere production and exhibition of Exhibit 56, without examining any witness to prove its execution, established the plaintiffs’ title or share in the suit property?

Whether the plaintiffs could establish ownership or title merely on the basis of revenue entries and revenue proceedings?

The Court applied Section 100 CPC, under which a second appeal lies only where the case involves a substantial question of law; the High Court cannot ordinarily reappreciate evidence or disturb concurrent findings of fact.

Relying on Russi Fisheries (P) Ltd. v. Bhavna Seth, 2026 SCC OnLine SC 555, and Jaichand (Dead) through LRs v. Sahnulal, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 3864, including the principles in Bholaram v. Ameerchand, (1981) 2 SCC 414, Madhavan Nair v. Bhaskar Pillai, (2005) 10 SCC 553, Kashibai v. Parwatibai, (1995) 6 SCC 213, Kulwant Kaur v. Gurdial Singh Mann, AIR 2001 SC 1273, and Kondiba Dagadu Kadam v. Savitribai Sopan Gujar, AIR 1999 SC 2213, the Court held that factual findings may be interfered with only where they are perverse, contrary to mandatory or settled law, based on inadmissible evidence, or rendered without evidence.

The Court also applied the evidentiary principle that mere marking or exhibition of a document does not, by itself, prove its execution or contents.

Revenue entries, being primarily fiscal in nature, cannot independently establish title or ownership.

The plaintiffs’ claim substantially depended on Exhibit 56, but they examined neither an attesting witness nor any other person to prove its execution or contents. Consequently, its mere production and exhibition did not establish the plaintiffs’ predecessor’s title or the plaintiffs’ alleged one-third share.

In contrast, the defendants relied on the post-abolition position under the Gujarat Devsthan Inams Abolition Act, 1969, the deposit of six “pats” under the Gujarat Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948, and the resulting revenue entries recognising their tenancy rights and ownership.

The entry relied upon by the plaintiffs, Entry No. 5298, had been reversed by the higher revenue authorities and, in any event, could not independently prove title.

Since the Trial Court and the First Appellate Court had concurrently evaluated the evidence and their conclusions were neither perverse nor contrary to law, no substantial question of law arose under Section 100 CPC.

It further held that the concurrent factual findings of the courts below were supported by the evidence and disclosed no perversity, legal error, or substantial question of law warranting second-appellate interference.

The second appeal was therefore dismissed in limine, the judgments and decrees of the Trial Court and First Appellate Court were confirmed, and no order was made as to costs; the decree was directed to be drawn accordingly.