Mere recovery of tainted money cannot sustain conviction without proof of demand and acceptance.

The appellant, a Patwari, was prosecuted under Sections 7 and 13(1)(d) read with Section 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, for allegedly demanding ₹9,000 from the complainant for preparing and supplying separate Rin Pustikas and revenue records.

According to the prosecution, the amount was subsequently settled at ₹6,000, of which ₹1,000 had allegedly already been paid, and a trap was organised for payment of the balance ₹5,000.

The Anti-Corruption Bureau recorded pre-trap and trap proceedings, applied phenolphthalein powder to the currency notes, and recovered the notes after they allegedly fell on the floor when the appellant attempted to pass them to his assistant.

The handwash of the appellant and the assistant allegedly turned pink.

The trial court convicted the appellant and sentenced him to one year’s rigorous imprisonment and a fine of ₹10,000 under the Prevention of Corruption Act, with the sentences to run concurrently.

In appeal, the appellant disputed proof of demand, acceptance and recovery, challenged the reliability and custody of the tape-recorded conversations, and relied on contradictions in the complaints and witness testimony.

The complainant was declared hostile but supported portions of the trap proceedings.

Whether the prosecution proved beyond reasonable doubt that the appellant demanded and accepted illegal gratification, which is necessary to establish offences under Sections 7 and 13(1)(d) read with Section 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988?

Whether recovery of phenolphthalein-treated currency notes and the positive handwash tests were sufficient to sustain the conviction in the absence of reliable proof of prior demand and voluntary acceptance?

Whether the tape-recorded conversations could be relied upon when the prosecution failed to establish their safe custody, authenticity, identification of the appellant’s voice, and compliance with the requirements governing electronic evidence?

The Court applied Sections 7, 13(1)(d) and 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, holding that proof of demand and acceptance or obtainment of illegal gratification is essential, and that mere recovery of tainted money is insufficient.

Relying on Mukhtiar Singh v. State of Punjab and Neeraj Dutta v. State (NCT of Delhi), the Court held that demand and acceptance must first be established by direct, documentary or circumstantial evidence before any statutory or factual presumption can operate; the presumption under Section 20 applies only after the foundational facts are proved.

The Court also relied on Rajesh Gupta v. State through CBI for the rule that tape-recorded evidence requires identification of the speaker’s voice, proof of accuracy, and exclusion of tampering or erasure.

It further referred to State of Kerala v. C.P. Rao, B. Jayaraj v. State of A.P., RPS Yadav v. CBI and Sejappa v. State to reiterate that recovery alone cannot establish bribery where substantive evidence of demand and voluntary acceptance is unreliable.

The Court found material inconsistencies between the first and second complaints regarding the amount allegedly demanded, the status of the Rin Pustikas, and the alleged reduction of the bribe amount.

The documents and the complainant’s own version indicated that the partition and mutation proceedings had already been completed and that the Rin Pustikas had substantially been delivered, weakening the alleged motive or occasion for a subsequent demand.

The recorded conversations were treated as unreliable because the cassette was not seized or sealed when allegedly handed over on 26 May 2008, its safe custody was not proved, the transcript was prepared later, and the appellant’s voice was never scientifically or otherwise satisfactorily identified.

The shadow witnesses did not consistently support the alleged demand or the trap proceedings, and one witness admitted that no demand was made in his presence.

Although the currency notes were recovered and handwash tests were positive, the notes were found on the floor rather than from the appellant’s possession, and the prosecution failed to establish beyond reasonable doubt that the appellant voluntarily accepted them as illegal gratification.

Accordingly, the foundational facts necessary to invoke the statutory presumption under Section 20 were not proved.

Mere recovery of the tainted currency and positive handwash tests could not sustain the conviction in the face of the material contradictions, unreliable electronic evidence, and inconsistent witness testimony.

The appeal was therefore allowed; the trial court’s judgment of conviction and sentence dated 30 March 2016 was set aside, and the appellant was acquitted by extending the benefit of doubt.

As the appellant was on bail, his bail bond was directed to remain operative for a further period of six months under Section 481 of the BNSS, 2023.