Concurrent findings of fact cannot be interfered with in second appeal absent a substantial question of law.

The appellant (plaintiff) filed a civil suit for declaration of title and permanent injunction regarding land bearing Khasra No. 480/1.

The plaintiff claimed ownership via a registered sale deed dated 08.06.1994 and subsequent mutation in 2004.

The dispute arose when the Naib Tehsildar (Defendant No. 3) allegedly cancelled the mutation on 07.10.2004 without notice, leading to a subsequent sale of the land to Defendant No. 6 on 26.04.2005.

The defendants contested the suit, alleging the 1994 sale deed was forged and violated Section 165(6) of the Chhattisgarh Land Revenue Code, as the land belonged to the Gond Scheduled Tribe and was transferred without the Collector's permission.

During the trial, the plaintiff filed an affidavit under Order XVIII Rule 4 of the CPC but failed to submit to cross-examination or lead further evidence.

Consequently, the Trial Court dismissed the suit for lack of evidence, a decision affirmed by the First Appellate Court.

1. Whether the concurrent findings of fact recorded by the lower courts were perverse or based on no evidence, warranting interference under Section 100 of the CPC.

2. Whether the failure of the plaintiff to submit to cross-examination rendered his evidence inadmissible, thereby failing to discharge the burden of proof regarding title and possession.

3. Whether the appeal involves any substantial question of law.

Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, which restricts the scope of a second appeal to cases involving a "substantial question of law" and limits interference with concurrent findings of fact unless they are shown to be perverse or based on no evidence.

Order XVIII Rule 4 of the CPC regarding the requirement for witnesses to be available for cross-examination for their affidavits to be read in evidence.

The principles established in State of Rajasthan and others v. Shiv Dayal and another (2019) 8 SCC 637, which defines the limited grounds upon which concurrent findings of fact can be challenged in a second appeal.

The court observed that the plaintiff bore the primary burden to prove ownership and possession, yet failed to adduce any oral or documentary evidence.

Although the plaintiff filed an affidavit in evidence, the court held it could not be considered because the plaintiff refused to subject himself to cross-examination despite multiple opportunities.

The High Court noted that the trial court's decision to close the plaintiff's evidence was previously upheld in a writ petition (WP 227 No. 862/2014), establishing a history of non-cooperation.

Consequently, the court reasoned that without evidence to support the 1994 sale deed or the illegality of the Tehsildar's order, the plaintiffs failed to meet the "preponderance of probabilities" standard.

Applying the rule in Shiv Dayal, the court found no perversity in the lower courts' findings, as they were reasonably reached based on the total absence of evidence from the plaintiff's side.

The court affirmed the judgments of the Trial Court and the First Appellate Court, ruling that the plaintiff’s failure to lead evidence or submit to cross-examination was fatal to the suit.

The concurrent findings that the plaintiff failed to establish title and possession were upheld as just and legal.

Relief of permanent injunction and declaration of title was denied.