Concurrent findings of fact cannot be re-appreciated in second appeal under Section 100 CPC.

The Plaintiff (Appellant) filed a suit for declaration of title over 1.691 hectares of land, seeking to declare four sale deeds executed between 1981 and 1983 in favor of Defendant Nos. 1 and 2 as null and void, and for a permanent injunction.

The Plaintiff claimed the land was purchased via self-earned income and the sale of his wife's ornaments, asserting that his brothers’ names were included in the deeds by mistake.

Defendant No. 4 (Plaintiff’s wife) filed a counter-claim asserting title over 1.205 hectares as stridhan.

Defendant No. 1 contended the property was joint family property acquired from joint income.

The Trial Court dismissed both the suit and the counter-claim on 27.01.2012, holding the land to be joint family property.

The First Appellate Court dismissed the subsequent appeals on 02.05.2016, affirming the Trial Court’s findings.

1. Whether the suit property was the self-acquired property of the Plaintiff or joint family property.

2. Whether the impugned sale deeds were nominal transactions liable to be declared null and void.

3. Whether the concurrent findings of fact by the lower courts warrant interference under Section 100 of the CPC.

4. Whether the appeal involves any substantial question of law.

The court primarily applied Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure (CPC), which restricts the scope of a Second Appeal to cases involving a "substantial question of law".

It relied on the principle that concurrent findings of fact are binding unless shown to be perverse, based on no evidence, or contrary to settled legal principles.

The court further cited State of Rajasthan and others v. Shiv Dayal and another (2019) 8 SCC 637, which establishes that interference with concurrent findings is only permissible if they are recorded de hors the pleadings, based on misreading of evidence, or are judicial decisions no reasonable judge could reach.

The High Court observed that the Trial Court had meticulously evaluated the evidence, correctly identifying that the Plaintiff failed to prove exclusive ownership.

Specifically, a key certificate (Ex. P-7) remained unproved as the author was not examined, and another document (Ex. P-8) indicated the land was recorded in the name of a temple rather than being inherited by the Plaintiff.

The court noted that the Plaintiff failed to establish that the 1981–1983 sale deeds were nominal or that any prior partition had occurred; thus, the property was rightly classified as joint family property where the Plaintiff’s possession was merely that of a co-owner.

In exercising its jurisdiction under Section 100 CPC, the High Court determined that the Appellant's challenges related entirely to the re-appreciation of evidence and questions of fact.

Since no perversity or misapplication of law was demonstrated in the concurrent findings of the lower courts, the High Court held that no substantial question of law existed.

The Court held that the concurrent findings of fact—stating the property was joint family property and that the Plaintiff failed to prove the sale deeds were void—did not give rise to any substantial question of law under Section 100 CPC.

Relief was denied to the Appellant.