Concurrent findings of fact regarding lineage and validity of sale deeds cannot be disturbed in second appeal absent perversity.

The Appellant/Plaintiff filed a suit for declaration of title and recovery of possession regarding land (Khasra No. 265) in Village Rampur, claiming it was her father Gurudayal Gond’s self-acquired property

She alleged that after her mother Dashmet Bai’s death in January 1983, Respondent No. 1 fraudulently executed a sale deed on 14.03.1983 by impersonating her mother

The Respondent contested this, asserting the Plaintiff was not Gurudayal’s heir and that Dashmet Bai validly sold the land before dying in September 1983

Both the Trial Court and First Appellate Court dismissed the suit, finding the Plaintiff failed to prove her lineage or the alleged fraud

1. Whether the Plaintiff established her status as the daughter and legal heir of late Gurudayal Gond

2. Whether the registered sale deed dated 14.03.1983 was executed through impersonation or fraud

3. Whether the High Court can interfere with concurrent findings of fact in a Second Appeal under Section 100 of the CPC

The Court applied Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, which restricts Second Appeals to "substantial questions of law" and precludes interference with concurrent findings of fact unless they are perverse or de hors the pleadings

It relied on State of Rajasthan v. Shiv Dayal (2019) regarding the limited grounds for challenging concurrent findings

Russi Fisheries Pvt. Ltd. v. Bhavna Seth (2026), which establishes that even erroneous findings of fact do not warrant interference in the absence of a clear error of law

The Court also noted that provisions of the Hindu Succession Act do not apply to Scheduled Tribes governed by customary law

The Court observed that the Plaintiff failed to provide any documentary evidence (e.g., birth certificate or school records) to prove her lineage

Critically, during cross-examination, the Plaintiff admitted her father was "Kauwa Gond," not Gurudayal, thereby destroying her own claim of heirship

Regarding the sale deed, the Court found the Respondent’s evidence—the original death certificate (Ex. D-5) and testimony from the Sub-Registrar—proved Dashmet Bai was alive during execution and died months later in September 1983, contradicting the Plaintiff's claim of impersonation

The Court also upheld the finding that the suit was barred by limitation under Article 59 of the Limitation Act

Finally, the Court determined that the Appellant's grievances related purely to the re-appreciation of evidence, which does not constitute a "substantial question of law" required to trigger jurisdiction under Section 100 CPC

The High Court dismissed the Second Appeal and upheld the judgments of the lower courts... The Court concluded that since the findings were based on a proper appreciation of evidence and lacked perversity, no substantial question of law arose for consideration