Condonation of delay cannot be granted as an act of generosity without sufficient cause and due diligence.

The applicant-appellants sought to prefer a second appeal against the judgment of the First Appellate Court dated 19.03.2021.

There was a delay of 1117 days in filing the appeal.

The applicants contended that the original defendant (Siddik Miya) was bedridden due to old-age illness from 2021 until his death on 19.07.2022, and his legal heirs were occupied with his care and ignorant of the law.

The respondent-opponents contested the application, noting that no execution case was filed for three years and that the applicants failed to explain the delay sufficiently.

No documentary evidence regarding the illness of the deceased defendant was submitted to the court.

Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963, which allows for condonation of delay if "sufficient cause" is shown.

The doctrine from Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag v. Mst. Katiji, emphasizing a rational and pragmatic approach to substantial justice.

The principle from Thirunagalingam v. Lingeswaran, which held that delay should not be condoned as an act of generosity and the court must first ascertain the bona fides of the explanation.

The principle from H. Guruswamy v. A. Krishnaiah, stating that rules of limitation are based on public policy and a party's inaction cannot be ignored merely to favor substantial justice over technicalities.

The court observed that while the expression "sufficient cause" should receive a liberal construction to advance justice, it does not mean that the requirement of explaining the delay is waived.

The court found the applicants' explanation—attributing the delay to the illness and death of the original defendant—unsupported by any documentary evidence or medical records.

The court noted that beyond "omnibus statements," the applicants failed to provide a day-to-day explanation for the 1117-day delay.

The court reasoned that the discretionary power under Section 5 cannot be exercised where there is evidence of negligence, carelessness, or a lack of due diligence.

The court concluded that the applicants had failed to demonstrate reasonable grounds or bona fides, and condoning such a long delay without merit would cause undue prejudice to the opposing party.

The application for condonation of delay was rejected as being devoid of merit and consequently, the second appeal (RSA No. 41 of 2025) was dismissed.

The court directed the records to be sent back to the trial court.