Condonation of delay for Government departments requires plausible explanation and cannot be granted mechanically.

The State of Chhattisgarh filed an application for leave to appeal against the judgment dated 17.11.2025 passed by the Additional Sessions Judge, Fast Track Court, Jashpur.

The trial court had acquitted Respondent No. 1 of charges under Sections 363, 366-A, 376(3), and 368/34 of the IPC and Section 6 of the POCSO Act, and acquitted Respondent Nos. 2 and 3 of charges under Section 368/34 of the IPC and Section 17 of the POCSO Act.

The State’s petition was filed with a delay of 52 days beyond the prescribed period of limitation.

The State contended the delay was due to bureaucratic procedures, departmental formalities, and the multi-functioning nature of government machinery.

1. Whether the provisions of Section 5 of the Limitation Act apply to an application for leave to appeal from an order of acquittal.

2. Whether the administrative delays and "procedural red-tape" inherent in government machinery constitute "sufficient cause" for condoning a delay of 52 days.

The court primarily applied Section 5 of the Limitation Act regarding the condonation of delay upon showing "sufficient cause".

It relied on Postmaster General v. Living Media India Limited (2012), which established that the government cannot claim a separate or more lenient period of limitation and that "procedural red-tape" is not an acceptable explanation in the age of modern technology.

The court further applied State of Haryana v. Chandra Mani (1996) and the stringent interpretation of "sufficient cause" from State of Madhya Pradesh v. Ramkumar Choudhary (2024) and Ajit Singh Thakur Singh v. State of Gujarat (1981), which mandate that sufficient cause must be traced to circumstances arising within the limitation period, and that negligence or inaction precludes condonation.

The High Court scrutinized the State’s explanation that the 52-day delay occurred because the Law & Legislative Affairs Department had to process the proposal and forward it to the Advocate General.

Applying the principles from Postmaster General, the court reasoned that government departments have a special obligation to perform duties with diligence and that condonation is an exception, not an anticipated benefit for the State.

The court found the State’s explanation lacked specificity and failed to demonstrate why the appeal could not be instituted within the initial 90-day window.

Highlighting the Ramkumar Choudhary precedent, the court emphasized that the "Sword of Damocles" should not hang over an acquitted person due to the State’s lackadaisical attitude or bureaucratic methodology.

The High Court refused to exercise its discretionary power to condone the 52-day delay, asserting that the law of limitation binds the government as strictly as a private litigant. Consequently, the petition for leave to appeal was rejected on the grounds of delay and laches.