Condonation of delay in commercial disputes requires "sufficient cause" and cannot be granted for negligence or inaction.

The Appellant filed an appeal against a money decree dated 21.10.2023 passed in CS (COMM.) 1294/2019.

The appeal was filed with a delay of 101 days and a further delay of 75 days in re-filing.

The Appellant contended that their erstwhile counsel stopped appearing after 30.11.2021 without communication, and they only learned of the judgment upon receiving execution summons on 10.01.2024.

The Respondent opposed the applications for condonation of delay, highlighting the lack of due diligence in commercial litigation.

1. Whether the Appellant established "sufficient cause" under Section 5 of the Limitation Act to condone the inordinate delay in filing and re-filing the appeal.

2. Whether the negligence or lack of communication by counsel constitutes a valid ground for condoning delay in the context of commercial disputes.

The Court applied Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963, read with Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, emphasizing that condonation is discretionary and not a right.

It relied on Pathapati Subba Reddy v. Special Deputy Collector (LA) (2024), which established that the law of limitation is based on public policy to end litigation and that Section 5 must be construed strictly in cases of negligence or inordinate delay.

The court applied the "strict" standard for commercial disputes as laid down in Government of Maharashtra v. Borse Brothers Engineers and Contractors Pvt. Ltd. (2021), which holds that the term "sufficient cause" is not elastic enough to cover long delays in commercial matters where speedy disposal is a statutory objective.

The Court found that the Appellant failed to provide a "sufficient cause" or cogent reasons for the delay.

It rejected the plea regarding the erstwhile counsel's non-appearance, noting that a commercial entity engaged in multiple litigations is expected to be diligent and cannot claim ignorance of its case status for years.

The Court observed that even after the Appellant admittedly gained knowledge of the decree on 10.01.2024, there was no satisfactory explanation for the subsequent delay in filing until 28.03.2024 or the delayed registration in July 2024.

Administrative challenges, such as internal drafting processes or summer vacations, were deemed routine and insufficient to justify bypassing statutory limitation periods.

The applications for condonation of delay in filing (CM APPL. 39990/2024) and re-filing (CM APPL. 39993/2024) were dismissed. Consequently, the main appeal [RFA(COMM) 270/2024] and all pending applications were dismissed as time-barred.