Condonation of inordinate delay requires continuous, cogent explanation of sufficient cause for the entire period.

The applicant was initially engaged as a Licensed Coolie Porter in 1997.

Following Railway Board instructions, he was absorbed as a regular Trackman on December 3, 2008.

He retired on May 31, 2018, after approximately nine years and five months of regular service.

Because he fell short of the ten-year qualifying service for pension, he requested that 50% of his service as a Porter be counted toward pensionary benefits.

The respondents contended that since he was absorbed after April 1, 2004, he was governed by the New Pension Scheme (NPS) and that the period spent as a Licensed Porter does not constitute "Railway Service".

Procedurally, the applicant had previously filed OA No. 948 of 2018 for the same relief but withdrew it on August 25, 2018, with liberty to file a fresh application.

The present application was filed on February 2, 2023, resulting in a delay of 1520 days.

To explain the delay, the applicant cited medical issues, including a tumor and surgery between 2021 and 2022.

1. Whether the applicant demonstrated "sufficient cause" under Section 21 of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985, to condone the delay of 1520 days in filing the Original Application.

2. Whether the principle of "continuing wrong" regarding the fixation of pay or pension can override the requirement to explain inordinate delay in the context of an application for condonation.

Section 21 of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985, which mandates that an application must be filed within one year of the cause of action, though a delay may be condoned if "sufficient cause" is shown.

Supreme Court’s decision in Basawaraj & Anr. v. Special Land Acquisition Officer, which established that negligence or lack of diligence precludes the condonation of delay, even if the delay is inordinate.

Principles from SS Rathore v. State of Madhya Pradesh regarding when a cause of action accrues.

The "continuing wrong" doctrine found in M.R. Gupta v. UOI.

The Tribunal found that the cause of action arose 90 days after the withdrawal of the first OA on August 25, 2018.

While the applicant provided medical documents for the years 2021 and 2022, the court noted a significant vacuum in the explanation for the period between 2018 and 2021.

The Tribunal reasoned that Section 21(3) of the Act casts a duty upon the applicant to provide a "sufficient and satisfactory explanation" for every day of the delay.

The court rejected the applicant's reliance on "continuing cause of action" precedents, determining that such principles do not absolve a party from the necessity of acting with due diligence when seeking to condone a multi-year delay.

Following the Basawaraj precedent, the court concluded that the applicant had remained inactive and negligent, and therefore, no legal justification existed to exercise discretionary powers to condone the 1520-day delay.

Consequently, MA No. 74 of 2023 for condonation of delay was dismissed, and the Original Application was subsequently dismissed at the diary stage.