Confession under Section 108 Customs Act and Approver Testimony provide sufficient prima facie grounds to preclude discharge.

The Revision Petitioner (Accused No. 3), a public servant, was charged by the CBI for offences under Sections 120B r/w 409 of the IPC and Sections 7, 8, and 12 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 2018.

The prosecution alleged that the petitioner, along with other customs officials at Calicut International Airport, accepted illegal gratification from passengers to release dutiable goods and passports without imposing penalties.

The petitioner filed a discharge petition (C.M.P.No.613/2025) before the Special Sessions Court, arguing that the case relied solely on uncorroborated statements of co-accused under Section 108 of the Customs Act and lacked recovery of bribe money.

The Special Court dismissed the discharge petition on 31.12.2025.

1. Whether the statements recorded under Section 108 of the Customs Act, 1962, and the statements of approvers are sufficient to prima facie establish a case for framing charges under Sections 438 and 442 of the BNSS.

2. Whether the court, at the stage of considering a discharge petition, can conduct a "mini-trial" or a rowing enquiry into the evidentiary value of statements and digital evidence.

The court applied Section 108 of the Customs Act, 1962, noting that voluntary statements made to gazetted officers are substantive evidence not hit by Sections 25 and 26 of the Evidence Act, as established in *Naresh J. Sukhawani v. Union of India* and *Pavunny v. Assistant Collector*.

It further applied Section 306 of the Cr.P.C. (corresponding to BNSS provisions) regarding the probative value of approver testimony.

The court also relied on the principle that for framing charges, the prosecution need only establish a "strong suspicion" or a prima facie case, rather than proof beyond reasonable doubt.

The court reasoned that while the petitioner argued that the Section 108 statements were weak evidence requiring corroboration, such determinations are matters for trial, not discharge.

The court highlighted that Accused Nos. 22 and 25 had been granted pardon and turned approvers, and their specific statements naming the petitioner regarding the receipt of bribe amounts (Rs. 15,000 and Rs. 30,000) created sufficient material to proceed.

The court distinguished the petitioner’s case from those co-accused whose proceedings were previously quashed (Annexure II), noting that while those individuals were ordinary travelers with no evidence against them beyond CCTV presence, the petitioner faced specific allegations of demanding and accepting gratification supported by approver statements.

The court emphasized that a "mini-trial" to evaluate the "gospel truth" of statements is prohibited at the discharge stage.

It held that there are sufficient materials, including statements from approvers and under Section 108 of the Customs Act, to prima facie justify the trial of the petitioner.

The court clarified that the evidentiary value and voluntariness of these statements, as well as the reliability of CCTV visuals, must be adjudicated during the final trial rather than at the stage of framing charges.