Consensual sexual relations with a major and married woman do not constitute the offence of rape.

The petitioner (victim) filed an application under Section 378(4) of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC) seeking leave to appeal against the judgment dated 01.02.2023 passed by the First Additional Sessions Judge (FTC), Bemetara.

The trial court had acquitted Respondent No. 2 (accused) of charges under Sections 376 and 376(2)(h) of the Indian Penal Code (IPC).

The prosecution case alleged that the respondent induced the petitioner with a promise of marriage and established physical relations on 25.07.2022.

At the time of the incident, the petitioner was already married to another man and was three months pregnant.

The written complaint was filed nearly three months after the incident.

After examining 16 prosecution witnesses, the trial court concluded the relationship was consensual.

Whether the petitioner should be granted leave to appeal against the judgment of acquittal under Section 378(4) of the CrPC.

Whether the physical relationship established between the accused and the petitioner (a major, married, and pregnant woman) constituted rape or was consensual in nature.

The Court primarily considered the requirements for granting leave to appeal against acquittal under Section 378(4) of the CrPC.

It applied the definition of "rape" under Section 375 of the IPC, specifically examining the vitiation of consent.

The Court relied on the principle that sexual intercourse with a major person does not amount to rape if established with the will and consent of the woman.

It further observed that consent is not validly given if obtained through fear of injury, misconception of fact, or if the victim is unable to understand the consequences of her consent; however, such factors must be proven by evidence.

The High Court examined the depositions and found no evidence that the respondent obtained consent by putting the petitioner in fear of death or hurt.

The Court emphasized that the petitioner was a major and a married woman at the time of the incident, making it impossible for her to believe she was lawfully married to the accused.

There was no evidence of unsoundness of mind, intoxication, or incapacity to understand the nature of the act.

The Court reasoned that since the petitioner was a major and married, her voluntary participation in physical relations—even if preceded by a promise of marriage—amounted to consensual sex rather than rape.

Consequently, the Court found no legal error in the trial court’s conclusion that consensual relations with a major married woman do not constitute an offense under Section 376 IPC.

The Court affirmed that physical relations established with a major and married woman with her consent do not constitute rape.

The CRMP was accordingly dismissed, and leave to appeal was denied.