Consent based on false promise of marriage from inception vitiates consent, constituting the offence of rape.

The Appellant (VL), a lady police constable, alleged that the Respondent, Mukesh Kumar Yadav, a fellow constable, committed rape upon her on multiple occasions between June and September 2013 under a false promise of marriage.

Consequently, the VL became pregnant. The Respondent allegedly coerced her into consuming termination pills on October 22 and 24, 2013, leading to profuse bleeding at the Aberdeen Police Station.

She was taken to G.B. Pant Hospital and subsequently moved by the Respondent to a private clinic (Arun’s Hospital), where he posed as her husband.

After the Respondent’s family refused the marriage proposal on January 1, 2014, the VL filed a complaint.

The Trial Court acquitted the Respondent on April 24, 2024, citing a lack of promise of marriage at the inception of the relationship and insufficient medical evidence; the State and the Victim preferred these appeals against the acquittal.

1. Whether the consent for sexual intercourse was obtained under a "misconception of fact" regarding a promise to marry, thereby attracting Section 376 of the IPC.

2. Whether the lack of immediate medical documentation and a formal "medico-legal case" at the time of the incident is fatal to the prosecution’s case.

3. Whether the Appellate Court can reverse a judgment of acquittal if the Trial Court’s findings are perverse or based on a misreading of evidence.

The court applied Section 376 (Rape), Section 312 (Causing miscarriage), and Section 417 (Cheating) of the IPC.

It relied on Section 90 of the IPC, which invalidates consent given under a "misconception of fact".

The court invoked the principles from State of Punjab v. Gurmit Singh, establishing that the sole testimony of a sexual assault victim is sufficient for conviction if it inspires confidence, and that negligence by an Investigating Officer (IO) should not prejudice the victim.

The court distinguished Uday v. State of Karnataka, noting that a promise to marry is "false" if the accused never intended to fulfill it from the inception.

The court also applied Arjun Pandit Rao Khotkar v. Kailash Kushanrao Gorantyal regarding the necessity of Section 65B certificates for electronic evidence.

The High Court found the Trial Court’s observation—that there was no promise to marry at the inception—to be "perverse and beyond records," noting consistent testimonies in the FIR, Section 164 statement, and oral evidence.

The Court reasoned that the Respondent’s conduct, such as threatening the VL that disclosure would result in him not marrying her, indicated a fraudulent intent to secure sexual favors rather than a legitimate breach of promise.

It excused the lack of medical records at G.B. Pant Hospital, accepting that the Respondent intentionally suppressed documents by taking the VL to a private clinic to maintain secrecy.

The Court severely criticized the IO for failing to secure a Section 65B certificate for the CDRs and for framing restricted queries to the medical examiner, attributing this to "Brotherhood in Uniform".

Despite these investigative lapses, the Court held that the oral testimonies of the VL and corroborating witnesses (PW19, PW21, PW22) established a "probabilities factor" sufficient for conviction.

The Respondent, Mukesh Kumar Yadav, is convicted under Sections 376 and 312 of the IPC; the Court ordered the convict to surrender by May 22, 2026, for the Trial Court to impose a sentence and directed the DGP to initiate disciplinary proceedings against the IO, SI Rangaswamy.