Consent decree for specific performance is not a mandatory injunction under Article 135 of Limitation Act.

Facts

The petitioners (Original Defendants No. 1, 2, and 7) challenge an order dated 26.05.2026 passed by the Executing Court

Source reference: p.1

The dispute stems from a suit for specific performance of a registered Agreement to Sell (ATS) dated 05.09.2006

Source reference: p.3

On 13.04.2015, a consent decree was passed based on a compromise where the defendants agreed to execute a sale deed for 7 acres of land in favor of the plaintiff after obtaining requisite permissions

Source reference: p.3, 10

In 2023, the plaintiff filed Execution Petition No. 4 of 2023 as the defendants failed to act

Source reference: p.3

The petitioners argued for the first time before the High Court that the execution is time-barred, claiming the consent decree is effectively a "mandatory injunction"

Source reference: p.4-5

Issues

1. Whether the consent decree drawn by the trial court in a suit for specific performance constitutes a decree granting a "mandatory injunction" under the Specific Relief Act

Source reference: p.8

2. Whether the execution petition is barred by limitation under Article 135 of the Limitation Act, 1963

Source reference: p.8

Law Applied

Section 39 of the Specific Relief Act (SRA), 1963, which defines mandatory injunctions

Source reference: p.14

Section 41(e) and (h) of the SRA, which bars the grant of an injunction to prevent a breach of contract that is specifically enforceable or when an equally efficacious relief is available

Source reference: p.14-15

The court distinguished between Article 135 of the Limitation Act (3-year period for mandatory injunctions) and Article 136 (12-year period for the execution of other decrees, including specific performance)

Source reference: p.9, 13

Principle that specific performance and mandatory injunctions are distinct reliefs governed by different chapters of the SRA

Source reference: p.13, 16

Reasoning

The Court reasoned that the suit was explicitly filed for the specific performance of a contract under Chapter II of the SRA, not for a mandatory injunction under Chapter VIII

Source reference: p.13

It noted that under Section 41(h) of the SRA, a court cannot grant a mandatory injunction where specific performance is the "equally efficacious relief"

Source reference: p.15

The Court observed that the compromise terms required the performance of contractual obligations (executing a sale deed), which fits the definition of specific performance

Source reference: p.12

Consequently, a decree arising from such a suit—even if by consent—retains the character of a decree for specific performance

Source reference: p.18

The Court rejected the petitioners' attempt to re-characterize the decree as a mandatory injunction to invoke the shorter 3-year limitation period of Article 135, holding that Article 136 (12 years) applies to such decrees

Source reference: p.21-22

Holding

The Court held that the consent decree is not a decree for mandatory injunction and therefore is not barred by Article 135 of the Limitation Act

The execution petition filed in 2023 for a 2015 decree is well within the 12-year limitation period prescribed by Article 136. The petition was dismissed in limine, and the order of the Executing Court was upheld

Source reference: p.22