Consent decree for specific performance is not a mandatory injunction under Article 135 of Limitation Act.

The petitioners (Original Defendants No. 1, 2, and 7) challenge an order dated 26.05.2026 passed by the Executing Court

The dispute stems from a suit for specific performance of a registered Agreement to Sell (ATS) dated 05.09.2006

On 13.04.2015, a consent decree was passed based on a compromise where the defendants agreed to execute a sale deed for 7 acres of land in favor of the plaintiff after obtaining requisite permissions

In 2023, the plaintiff filed Execution Petition No. 4 of 2023 as the defendants failed to act

The petitioners argued for the first time before the High Court that the execution is time-barred, claiming the consent decree is effectively a "mandatory injunction"

1. Whether the consent decree drawn by the trial court in a suit for specific performance constitutes a decree granting a "mandatory injunction" under the Specific Relief Act

2. Whether the execution petition is barred by limitation under Article 135 of the Limitation Act, 1963

Section 39 of the Specific Relief Act (SRA), 1963, which defines mandatory injunctions

Section 41(e) and (h) of the SRA, which bars the grant of an injunction to prevent a breach of contract that is specifically enforceable or when an equally efficacious relief is available

The court distinguished between Article 135 of the Limitation Act (3-year period for mandatory injunctions) and Article 136 (12-year period for the execution of other decrees, including specific performance)

Principle that specific performance and mandatory injunctions are distinct reliefs governed by different chapters of the SRA

The Court reasoned that the suit was explicitly filed for the specific performance of a contract under Chapter II of the SRA, not for a mandatory injunction under Chapter VIII

It noted that under Section 41(h) of the SRA, a court cannot grant a mandatory injunction where specific performance is the "equally efficacious relief"

The Court observed that the compromise terms required the performance of contractual obligations (executing a sale deed), which fits the definition of specific performance

Consequently, a decree arising from such a suit—even if by consent—retains the character of a decree for specific performance

The Court rejected the petitioners' attempt to re-characterize the decree as a mandatory injunction to invoke the shorter 3-year limitation period of Article 135, holding that Article 136 (12 years) applies to such decrees

The execution petition filed in 2023 for a 2015 decree is well within the 12-year limitation period prescribed by Article 136. The petition was dismissed in limine, and the order of the Executing Court was upheld