Consent given under a misconception of marriage from the relationship's inception vitiates consent under Section 90 IPC.

The appellant was convicted by the Trial Court under Section 376 of the IPC and Section 6 of the POCSO Act for allegedly establishing a physical relationship with the victim for over a year on the pretext of marriage, resulting in pregnancy.

The appellant later admitted the relationship and paternity but contended the victim was a major and the relationship was consensual.

The prosecution relied on a medical report (Exhibit-3) and an age determination report (Exhibit-4) prepared at a late stage to assert minority.

The appellant challenged the conviction, primarily contesting the victim’s age and the procedural validity of the age determination evidence.

The court applied Section 376 and Section 90 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) and Section 6 of the POCSO Act.

The court relied on Section 94 of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015 for age determination standards.

Regarding medical age estimation, the court applied the "margin of error" principle (plus/minus two years) established in Rajak Mohammad v. H.P. (2018) and Court on its Own Motion v. NCT of Delhi (2024), which mandates adopting the upper age limit in the reference range in favor of the accused.

The court found that the prosecution failed to produce primary age evidence like matriculation or birth certificates.

The medical assessment estimated the victim's age between 16 and 17 years; however, applying the judicial precedent of a two-year "margin of error," the court determined the victim’s upper age could be 19 years, making her a major at the time of the occurrence.

Regarding the IPC charge, the court noted the appellant's own admissions in court filings and letters confirming the relationship and paternity.

The court reasoned that since the physical relationship was induced by a promise to marry—which the appellant later refused—the consent was obtained under a "misconception of fact" per Section 90 IPC, rendering it invalid for the purposes of Section 376.

The court held that the period of seven years and one month already served by the appellant was sufficient to meet the ends of justice and directed his discharge.