Consent of an Employee is Mandatory for Deputation to a Post Outside Parent Cadre

The petitioner, a Professor in the Graduate Department of Physics at Jai Prakash University, challenged two notifications (dated 27.05.2026 and 04.06.2026) issued by the University.

These notifications sought to depute/appoint him as an In-charge Principal at another location without his prior consent.

The petitioner submitted a representation to the Chancellor and Vice-Chancellor on 01.06.2026, which remained pending.

He sought a stay on these notifications to prevent interference with his current posting.

1. Whether the University can validly depute a Professor to the post of In-charge Principal without obtaining the mandatory consent of the concerned employee.

2. Whether the impugned notifications violate the Statute framed by the Hon’ble Chancellor regarding the appointment of Principals.

Clause 3.2.6 of the Statute for Appointment of Principal (Notification No. B.S.U (Statutes-14/2023-647/GS(I) dated 03.05.2024), which mandates that the consent of the relevant person is necessary for appointment/deputation as In-charge Principal.

The Division Bench ruling in Smt. Subha Sinha v. Veer Kunwar Singh University (2008) 1 PLJR 576, establishing that deputation cannot occur without consent.

The Supreme Court’s definition of "deputation" from State of Punjab v. Inder Singh (1997) 8 SCC 372, which holds that deputation involves service outside the parent cadre and fundamentally requires the consent of the person so deputed.

The Court examined the petitioner’s contention that no consent was sought prior to the issuance of the transfer/deputation orders.

The University argued that such deputations were necessary due to a dire need for Principals in various colleges and cited a similar case (C.W.J.C. No. 9715 of 2026) where a representation was ordered to be considered.

The Court noted that the statutory notification dated 03.05.2024 specifically governed these appointments.

By linking the legal requirement of "consent" found in the Chancellor's Statute and Supreme Court precedents to the fact that the petitioner’s grievance was already pending before the Chancellor, the Court determined that the executive action must be reconciled with the established law of deputation.

The Court ordered that the respondent authorities shall not give effect to the impugned notifications until a final order is passed on the representation, effectively granting the petitioner interim protection.