Consent to sex is not vitiated by a promise of marriage if the woman is already married.

The Petitioner sought to quash FIR No. 791 of 2024 and the resulting charge-sheet involving sections 69, 79, 351(2), and 352 of the Bhartiya Nyaya Sanhita (BNS), sections 376(2)(n) and 377 of the IPC, and sections 66(E) and 67(A) of the IT Act.

Respondent No. 2 (a 24-year-old married woman) and the Petitioner (aged 26) engaged in a physical relationship between January 2023 and July 2024, during which they traveled and exchanged gifts.

The Complainant alleged the Petitioner engaged in physical relations under a false pretext of marriage and later refused to marry her upon learning of her prior subsisting marriage.

Evidence showed the Complainant was still legally married to another man during the entire duration of the relationship.

It was further noted the Complainant had a history of filing similar quashed rape allegations against others.

The Court primarily applied Section 352 of the BNS (and Section 376(2)(n) of the IPC) regarding sexual intercourse on the false promise of marriage.

It relied on the precedent of *Pramod Kumar Navratna v. State of Chhattisgarh* (2026), which established that a promise of marriage to a person with a subsisting marriage is legally unenforceable and cannot be deemed a "misconception of fact" under Section 90 of the IPC to vitiate consent.

Furthermore, the Court applied the guidelines from *State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal* (1992), specifically categories 1, 3, and 7, which permit quashing proceedings that are maliciously instituted or fail to disclose a prima facie offence.

The Court reasoned that since Respondent No. 2 was already married, she was ineligible to marry the Petitioner under personal laws (Hindu Marriage Act/Special Marriage Act), rendering any alleged "promise of marriage" legally void and incapable of inducing a "misconception of fact".

The court observed the relationship was entirely consensual between two mature adults who traveled extensively together over 18 months.

There was no evidence that the Petitioner had a deceptive intent from the inception; rather, the relationship deteriorated after the Petitioner discovered the Complainant’s hidden marital status.

The court noted that the Complainant’s professional background (or awareness) and her history of similar litigation suggested the complaint was a malicious attempt to use the state machinery for a personal grudge.

The High Court allowed the petition and quashed FIR No. 791 of 2024 and the resulting charge-sheet to prevent the abuse of legal process.

No order as to costs was made.