Consistency in multiple dying declarations and medical fitness to speak forms a valid basis for murder conviction.

On September 26, 1998, Roshan (the deceased) was admitted to Safdarjung Hospital with 50% burns

She gave three separate statements: first to the attending doctor (PW-21) recorded in the MLC, second to the Investigating Officer (PW-18/23), and third to the SDM (PW-7).

In all declarations, she alleged that her husband (the Appellant) poured kerosene from a stove and set her ablaze following a quarrel over dowry demands.

The Appellant claimed he was not present at the time and suggested the incident was an accidental stove burst.

The Trial Court convicted the Appellant under Sections 302, 304-B, and 498-A of the IPC.

The Appellant challenged the conviction primarily on the ground of inconsistencies in the multiple dying declarations.

1. Whether multiple dying declarations that contain minor inconsistencies can form the sole basis of conviction under Section 302 IPC

2. Whether the prosecution proved the ingredients of dowry death under Section 304-B IPC and cruelty under Section 498-A IPC

3. Whether the conduct of the Appellant post-incident and scientific evidence (CFSL report) corroborated the dying declarations

The court applied Section 302 (Murder), Section 304-B (Dowry Death), and Section 498-A (Cruelty) of the Indian Penal Code, 1860.

It relied on the evidentiary principle of nemo moriturus praesumitur mentiri (a man will not meet his Maker with a lie in his mouth) enshrined in Section 32(1) of the Indian Evidence Act.

The court followed the Supreme Court’s synthesis in Abhishek Sharma v. State (NCT of Delhi) regarding multiple dying declarations, which mandates that such statements must be voluntary, reliable, and consistent in material particulars.

It further applied Section 8 of the Evidence Act regarding the relevance of the accused's conduct.

The Court found that all three dying declarations were materially consistent regarding the core "substratum" of the case: the Appellant poured kerosene and ignited the deceased.

It rejected the Appellant's argument regarding "fit for statement" discrepancies, noting that different doctors (PW-21 and PW-22) certified her fitness at different stages of her treatment.

The Court dismissed the "accidental stove burst" theory because the CFSL report confirmed kerosene residues on the victim's clothes—implying kerosene was poured—and photographs showed the stove was intact, not exploded.

The Appellant’s absconding nature and failure to visit his critically injured wife were deemed incriminating conduct under Section 8 of the Evidence Act.

While the allegations of dowry demands (scooter, fridge, and Rs. 50,000/-) were upheld as proving cruelty under Section 498-A, the Court determined that once a conviction for murder under Section 302 is established based on direct evidence, a parallel conviction for the "lesser" or alternative charge of dowry death (Section 304-B) is not warranted.

However, it set aside the conviction under Section 304-B IPC, holding it was unnecessary given the affirmation of the murder charge.

The Court directed the Appellant to surrender within two weeks to serve the remaining sentence.