Consultative process for appointing Public Prosecutors must clearly distinguish between Government Pleader and Prosecutor roles.

The petitioners, practicing lawyers in Alappuzha with over 20 years of experience, challenged the selection and appointment of the 4th respondent as District Government Pleader (DGP) and Public Prosecutor (PP).

A notice was issued on 18.12.2024 inviting applications specifically for the post of "District Government Pleader".

Following a consultative process where the District Judge recommended three out of eight candidates based on trial experience, the 4th respondent was appointed to both the DGP and PP posts.

The petitioners contended that the consultative process was flawed and that the notice was misleading as it omitted the "Public Prosecutor" designation, leading eligible criminal law practitioners to abstain from applying.

The court applied Section 18 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita (BNSS), 2023, which mandates appointment of Public Prosecutors by the State Government in consultation with the Sessions Judge.

It relied on the precedent *Suo motu revision petition initiated by the High Court v. State of Kerala* [2025 KLT OnLine 1731], establishing that the District Judge’s opinion carries primacy in this consultative process.

The court further clarified that while the Kerala Government Law Officers Rules, 1978, govern "public posts," Public Prosecutors under the BNSS do not hold a "public post" in the traditional sense, and thus their appointment is strictly governed by Section 18 of the BNSS.

Rule 7(2) of the 1978 Rules was also noted, which allows for the separation of the offices of DGP and PP.

The court found no merit in the challenge against the consultative process itself; the District Judge had interacted with candidates and excluded those lacking trial experience in serious Sessions cases, which constitutes a valid application of mind.

However, the court found a fatal procedural flaw in the recruitment notice dated 18.12.2024.

Although the "subject" line mentioned "Public Prosecutor," the body of the notice invited applications only for "District Government Pleader".

Since Rule 7(2) allows these posts to be separate, a reasonable practitioner could assume a separate notification for the PP post would follow.

By appointing the 4th respondent to both roles based on a notice that only explicitly called for one, the State effectively excluded eligible candidates who specialized in criminal law and were waiting for a PP-specific notification.

While the consultative work of the District Judge was upheld, the selection process was vitiated by the exclusion of potential applicants due to the vague notice.

The Court set aside the selection and appointment of the 4th respondent but allowed her to continue as an interim measure to avoid a vacuum.

The respondents were directed to issue a fresh, explicit notification for both the District Government Pleader and Public Prosecutor posts and conduct a new selection process considering all eligible applicants.