Contempt requires clear, knowing and intentional disobedience of a court order.

The complainant, owner of land in Konadasapura Village, challenged its acquisition in W.P. No. 19254/2021.

On 27 October 2021, the Single Judge directed the parties to maintain status quo concerning the property; that direction was extended on 24 November 2021

The complainant alleged that, on 19 September 2022, the accused entered the property, removed fencing and shrubs, and carried out clearance, levelling and drainage works in breach of the orders.

The accused maintained that limited works were undertaken for traffic safety, that the drainage had been removed and the property restored, and that the complainant had since transferred the property.

The complainant sought contempt proceedings under Sections 11 and 12 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, read with Article 215 of the Constitution.

1. Whether the alleged clearance, levelling and drainage works amounted to wilful disobedience of the status quo orders dated 27 October and 24 November 2021

2. Whether contempt proceedings should continue in light of the accused’s explanations, the asserted removal of the drainage works, and the complainant’s alleged transfer of the property

Under Article 215 of the Constitution and Sections 11 and 12 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, contempt requires clear disobedience of the court’s order.

The Court stated that the alleged contemnor must have knowledge of the order and an intention to violate it; contumacious conduct is an essential element for a finding of contempt.

The operative interim direction required the parties to maintain status quo concerning the property.

The Court considered the allegations that the property’s fencing and vegetation had been removed and that works had altered its condition, alongside the accused’s explanations that the works were limited to safety-related clearance and levelling, that the drainage had been removed, and that the property had been restored.

It also noted the objection that the complainant had transferred the property and no longer had subsisting rights in it.

In view of these circumstances and the assertions in the objections, the Court found no justification for continuing contempt proceedings; it did not make a finding that contempt had been proved.

It left the parties at liberty to raise their contentions in the pending writ petition and disposed of all pending interlocutory applications.