Continuation of deemed suspension after release requires a prompt, reasoned order under Rule 4(3)(b).

The petitioner, a government doctor, was deemed suspended from 29 June 2022 after being detained for more than 48 hours in connection with two criminal cases.

After his release on 20 October 2022, he applied the next day to resume duty and challenge the deemed suspension.

The authorities took no decision until this Court, in an earlier writ petition, directed them to consider his application.

On 12 July 2024, the competent authority revoked the suspension but deferred the decision on service continuity and salary until the criminal cases concluded.

The petitioner challenged that order.

One criminal case had resulted in his acquittal, while proceedings in the other had been stayed by the High Court.

Whether, under Rule 4(3)(b) of the U.P. Government Servant (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1999, the competent authority was required to decide promptly and expressly whether to continue, revoke, or modify the petitioner’s deemed suspension after receiving his representation.

Whether the authority could defer consideration of salary and service benefits for the period after the petitioner’s release from custody until revocation of suspension, without deciding whether the suspension was lawfully continued during that period.

Rule 4(3)(a) of the 1999 Rules provides for deemed suspension when a government servant is detained for more than 48 hours.

Under Rule 4(3)(b), upon the employee’s written intimation and representation after release, the competent authority must consider the relevant facts and the Rules and pass an appropriate order continuing, revoking, or modifying the suspension; Rule 4(8) provides that suspension remains in force until modified or revoked.

Read together, these provisions require an express decision for continuance of deemed suspension beyond release from custody, and the decision-making obligation must be discharged promptly.

The Court distinguished Union of India v. Rajiv Kumar, (2003) 6 SCC 516, because the Central Rules considered there had no provision analogous to Rule 4(3)(b).

It also relied on the principles governing mandatory and directory provisions, including that legislative intent is assessed from the language, scheme, purpose, and consequences of the provision.

The petitioner’s representation dated 21 October 2022 triggered the authority’s statutory duty to consider whether his deemed suspension should continue, be revoked, or be modified.

Yet no decision was made for nearly two years, and the State offered no reason for the delay.

The authority ultimately revoked the suspension while the criminal cases were still pending, but had neither explained why it could not decide the representation earlier nor issued a reasoned order justifying suspension during the intervening period.

The Court held that the deferral of salary consideration until the criminal cases concluded did not satisfy Rule 4(3)(b).

Whether continuation of suspension during the intervening period was justified—and the resulting salary entitlement—was for the competent authority to determine afresh, on reasons, rather than for the Court to decide in the first instance.

It directed the competent authority to reconsider the petitioner’s entitlement to salary for the period of deemed suspension, excluding the period of detention, and to issue a reasoned and speaking order within two months of production of a certified copy of the judgment.