Contradictory claims of ownership and adverse possession cannot defeat execution of an eviction order.

The Respondent obtained an eviction order dated 25 February 2019 in respect of the subject premises. An execution petition was filed on 20 October 2023, and warrants of possession were issued on 10 January 2025 in the absence of any stay.

When the warrants were being executed on 12 February 2025, the Petitioner, General Talkies Pvt. Ltd., filed objections under Order XXI Rule 99 of the Code of Civil Procedure, claiming that it was the owner and occupant of the premises pursuant to an arrangement dating from the 1970s and alleging fraud, collusion and lack of service in the eviction proceedings.

The Executing Court stayed execution temporarily and directed the Petitioner to file an affidavit specifying the date and legal capacity of its possession, including particulars of any claim based on title, adverse possession, tenancy or licence.

Instead of filing the directed affidavit, the Petitioner filed a subsequent application dated 27 February 2025, asserting that it had been in possession since June 1995 and had acquired title by adverse possession.

The Executing Court rejected the objections, holding that the Petitioner had taken mutually inconsistent positions—ownership since the 1970s and adverse possession since 1995—and had failed to establish a prima facie independent title.

The Petitioner challenged that order under the proviso to Section 25B(8) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958.

Whether the Executing Court erred in rejecting the Petitioner’s objections after finding that it had taken inconsistent and mutually irreconcilable pleas regarding the nature and commencement of its alleged title.

Whether the plea of adverse possession, introduced through the subsequent application, disclosed a legally sustainable claim requiring a detailed inquiry into the documents relied upon by the Petitioner.

Whether the Impugned Order suffered from jurisdictional error, manifest illegality, material irregularity, perversity or an error apparent on the face of the record warranting interference under the proviso to Section 25B(8) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958.

The Court applied the proviso to Section 25B(8) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958, holding that the High Court’s jurisdiction is supervisory and revisional, not appellate; interference is limited to jurisdictional errors, manifest illegality, material irregularity, perversity, or an error apparent on the face of the record, and the High Court cannot undertake a fresh appreciation of evidence merely because another view is possible.

Relying on Sarla Ahuja v. United India Insurance Co. Ltd., (1998) 8 SCC 119; Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Ltd. v. Dilbahar Singh, (2014) 9 SCC 78; Abid-Ul-Islam v. Inder Sain Dua, (2022) 6 SCC 30; Pankaj Pahwa v. Prem Wati, 2024:DHC:9322; and Sanjeev Hiranandani v. Sunny Grover, 2025:DHC:11285, the Court reiterated that revisional scrutiny examines the legality and propriety of the decision-making process rather than substituting the Court’s view for that of the Rent Controller.

Under Order XXI Rules 97 and 99 CPC, a person claiming an independent right or alleging dispossession during execution may raise objections before the Executing Court.

A plea of adverse possession presupposes title in another person and requires specific pleadings establishing the identity of the true owner, the date and circumstances from which possession became hostile, the nature of the hostile possession, and its continuity for the statutory period; mere long or uninterrupted possession is insufficient.

The principle against approbation and reprobation prohibits a litigant from obtaining an advantage on one representation and subsequently taking an inconsistent position to secure further relief.

The Court found that the Petitioner’s initial application asserted ownership acquired through an arrangement in the 1970s, and that this assertion formed the basis for the interim stay of the possession warrants.

The Petitioner thereafter failed to file the affidavit directed by the Executing Court and, only after the Respondent had replied, introduced a materially different plea of adverse possession commencing in 1995.

The Court held that ownership acquired under an arrangement and ownership claimed through adverse possession rested on fundamentally different premises: the former asserted independent title, while the latter acknowledged title in another and alleged hostile possession against it.

The Petitioner neither consistently identified the true owner nor specified when and how its possession became hostile. Consequently, the adverse-possession plea was not legally sustainable even on its own terms.

The Executing Court had considered the pleadings, procedural history, directions issued, and the Petitioner’s conduct, and had provided cogent reasons for rejecting the objections. A fresh examination of the possession letter and other documents would improperly convert the revision into an appeal, which was impermissible under the limited scope of Section 25B(8).

The Impugned Order dated 5 May 2025 disclosed no jurisdictional error, material irregularity, perversity or other infirmity warranting revisional interference.

Accordingly, RC.REV. 155/2025 was dismissed, and the pending applications were disposed of.