Conviction based on sole eyewitness testimony is unsustainable if conduct is unnatural and evidence lacks reliability.

The prosecution alleged that on February 22, 1995, the appellants forcibly entered the house of Kisto Mehra (P.W.-5) and his wife Daya Devi (P.W.-6).

Finding that Kisto Mehra had fled, Nundeo Mehra allegedly assaulted Santu Mehra (the deceased) with a *bhujali*, resulting in his death, while other appellants stood guard or committed theft.

The Trial Court convicted Nundeo Mehra under Section 302 of the IPC and the remaining alive appellants under Section 148 of the IPC.

The appellants challenged the conviction on grounds of prior enmity, lack of independent witnesses, and the unreliable testimony of the sole eyewitness, P.W.-6.

Whether the conviction of the appellants can be sustained solely on the testimony of the informant (P.W.-6) as a sole eyewitness.

Whether the prosecution proved the charges of murder and rioting beyond all reasonable doubt despite material contradictions and unnatural conduct of the witnesses.

The court applied Section 302 (murder) and Section 148 (rioting with deadly weapons) of the IPC.

It relied on Section 134 of the Evidence Act, 1872, which stipulates that no particular number of witnesses is required to prove a fact.

The court cited *Bipin Kumar Mondal v. State of W.B.* and *Namdeo v. State of Maharashtra* to establish that a conviction can be based on a solitary witness if their testimony is "wholly reliable," emphasizing quality over quantity.

It further applied the principle from *Munshi Prasad v. State of Bihar* that defense witnesses are entitled to equal weight as prosecution witnesses.

and the "benefit of doubt" doctrine as articulated in *Rang Bahadur Singh v. State of U.P.*

The High Court found the testimony of the sole eyewitness (P.W.-6) unreliable due to physical inconsistencies regarding the place of occurrence.

While P.W.-6 claimed to see the assault from her courtyard, the Investigating Officer (P.W.-7) and the Inquest Report (Ext.-3) showed the body was found in a separate house/location that would obstruct her view.

The court noted a "material contradiction" between P.W.-6’s fardbeyan (claiming the deceased was dragged out) and her court testimony (claiming he walked out voluntarily).

Furthermore, the conduct of P.W.-5 (husband) was deemed "unrealistic" and "unnatural"; although he claimed to be hiding in a tree in fear, defense witnesses (D.W.-1, D.W.-2) and a hostile witness (P.W.-1) testified he arrived later in a wet condition after having taken a bath.

Given the admitted "old enmity" between the parties, the court held that these lapses created a reasonable doubt regarding the appellants' complicity.

The High Court set aside the judgment of conviction dated July 28, 1998, and the order of sentence dated July 29, 1998.

The appellants were acquitted of all charges and discharged from their bail bonds.

The appeal was allowed, granting the appellants the "benefit of doubt."