Conviction Based on Sterling Testimony of Child Victim and Corroborative Medical Evidence Upheld Under POCSO Act

The appellant was convicted by the Trial Court under Section 5(m) read with Section 6 of the POCSO Act for sexually assaulting his minor niece (PW1), whom he raised as a daughter

On 06.03.2018, while the victim's aunt (PW13) was at the market, the appellant inserted his finger into the victim’s genitalia, causing sharp pain and bleeding

The appellant claimed the injuries resulted from a bicycle fall and that he voluntarily took the victim to the hospital, seeking to negate criminal intent

Procedurally, the appellant challenged the conviction on grounds of material improvements in the victim's Section 164 statement and the hostile testimony of the aunt (PW13)

The court applied Section 5(m) and Section 6 of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences (POCSO) Act, 2012, which defines and penalizes aggravated penetrative sexual assault

The court relied on the evidentiary principle that conviction can be based on the sole testimony of a prosecutrix if it is of "sterling quality," as established in Rai Sandeep v. State (NCT of Delhi) and Nirmal Premkumar v. State

Regarding procedural lapses, the court applied the principle from Moidu K. vs. State of Kerala, holding that non-compliance with Section 232 Cr.P.C. does not vitiate proceedings unless "serious and substantial prejudice" is proved

The Court found the victim’s (PW1) testimony consistent across the FIR, the Section 164 statement, and her deposition, describing it as "sterling quality"

The medical evidence (MLC Ext. PW3/A) corroborated her version by recording a 2 cm vaginal tear and a 1 cm perineal tear, which were inconsistent with the defense's theory of a bicycle fall

Although the aunt (PW13) turned partly hostile, the Court noted that her admission regarding the victim's bleeding and immediate hospitalization corroborated the factum of the injury

The Court dismissed the argument regarding "material improvements" in the 164 statement (referring to prior incidents), noting such omissions in the FIR do not demolish an otherwise reliable testimony

Furthermore, because the appellant occupied a position of trust ("daddy"), the Court found no motive for false implication

It held that the prosecution proved the appellant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt and that the procedural omission of a Section 232 Cr.P.C. hearing caused no prejudice to the accused. The appeal was dismissed, and the conviction and sentence of 10 years’ rigorous imprisonment were upheld