Conviction cannot stand where eyewitness presence is doubtful and testimony lacks reliable corroboration.

On 20 September 1986 at approximately 9:30 p.m., Moti Ram was allegedly taken from his tube-well by Mani Ram and Hemraj alias Happu and shot in a nearby bajra field. His son, Chob Singh (PW-1), allegedly witnessed the occurrence and lodged an oral First Information Report at 11:00 p.m. naming both accused under Section 302 IPC.

The post-mortem disclosed one firearm entry wound with a corresponding exit wound and two incised wounds on the head.

The prosecution examined Chob Singh, Prem Singh and Naubat as eyewitnesses, besides formal and medical witnesses.

The Trial Court convicted both accused under Section 302 IPC and sentenced them to life imprisonment on 25 May 1987.

During the appeal, Hemraj died and the appeal abated against him; the Court therefore adjudicated the case only against surviving appellant Mani Ram.

Whether the testimony of Chob Singh (PW-1) was sufficiently reliable to establish his presence as an eyewitness and prove Mani Ram’s participation in the murder?

Whether the evidence of Prem Singh (PW-2) and Naubat (PW-3), who did not identify Mani Ram as the assailant, was sufficient to sustain his conviction under Section 302 IPC?

Whether the Trial Court’s conviction was sustainable where the eyewitness evidence was materially inconsistent, the medical evidence indicated only one firearm injury, and no specific role was established against Mani Ram?

The Court applied Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code, which penalises murder, and the fundamental criminal-law principle that guilt must be proved by reliable evidence beyond reasonable doubt.

It held that eyewitness testimony must be critically scrutinised, particularly where the witness’s presence at the scene or conduct is doubtful.

Relying on Badan Singh v. State of M.P., (2003) 12 SCC 792, the Court reiterated that consistency between witnesses is not conclusive of truthfulness and that evidence may be rejected if the witnesses’ conduct or claimed presence makes the prosecution case doubtful.

The Court also considered the evidentiary effect of material contradictions between ocular and medical evidence, the testimony of hostile witnesses, and the principle that an accused must receive the benefit of reasonable doubt.

It further noted that the Trial Court had not invoked Section 34 IPC while framing the charge and had not assigned a specific role to Mani Ram.

The Court found Chob Singh’s presence doubtful because, although he claimed to be present at the tube-well, he neither raised an alarm nor attempted to rescue his father when the accused allegedly took him away.

The alleged place of shooting was 60–70 steps from the tube-well, surrounded by fully grown crops, and the prosecution did not establish the bulb’s wattage or that the incident could have been observed from that distance at night.

His account also conflicted with Naubat’s statement regarding whether he and the deceased were lying on the same cot, and his assertion that both accused fired was inconsistent with the post-mortem evidence showing only one firearm entry wound and one corresponding exit wound.

His subsequent assertion that the accused also used knives was treated as an improvement over the earlier version and further undermined his credibility.

Prem Singh and Naubat, having turned hostile, identified only Hemraj as the person who fired and did not identify or attribute any role to Mani Ram.

Their evidence suggested that they reached the scene only after hearing the gunshot.

In view of these inconsistencies, the witnesses’ unnatural conduct, the absence of reliable identification evidence against Mani Ram, and the Trial Court’s failure to critically assess the evidence, the Court held that the prosecution had not proved Mani Ram’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

The judgment and order dated 25 May 1987 convicting and sentencing him to life imprisonment were set aside, and the appeal was allowed by granting him the benefit of doubt.

As Mani Ram was already on bail, he was not required to surrender; his personal bonds were cancelled and his sureties discharged.