Conviction for child sexual assault cannot stand where material inconsistencies and medical evidence create reasonable doubt.

The appellant was prosecuted for allegedly abducting PW3, a minor boy, on 26 July 2014, taking him to a jhuggi, wrongfully confining him, and committing carnal intercourse against the order of nature. He was also alleged to have criminally intimidated the child. The prosecution relied principally on PW3’s statements, the testimony of his parents and other witnesses, school records concerning his age, and medical evidence. The FIR was registered on 01 August 2014 on the basis of PW3’s statement

The trial court framed charges under Sections 342, 363, 377 and Part I of Section 506 IPC and Section 4 of the POCSO Act, which was subsequently amended to include Section 6 of the POCSO Act. By judgment dated 26 August 2017, the appellant was convicted and sentenced principally to ten years’ rigorous imprisonment each under Section 377 IPC and Section 6 of the POCSO Act, with the sentences directed to run concurrently.

In appeal, the appellant challenged the proof of PW3’s age, the reliability and consistency of PW3’s account, the absence of medical corroboration, the delay in reporting, the non-production of the FSL report, and inconsistencies concerning his arrest

The Court applied Sections 342, 363, 377 and Part I of Section 506 IPC and Section 6 of the POCSO Act, requiring the prosecution to establish each ingredient of the charged offences beyond reasonable doubt

It applied the principle that the victim’s testimony in a sexual-offence case may, in an appropriate case, sustain a conviction without medical corroboration; however, where the surrounding evidence contains material contradictions and circumstances creating doubt, the accused must receive the benefit of that doubt

The Court treated school admission records maintained in the ordinary course of official business, supported by the parents’ affidavit and the school principal’s testimony, as sufficient to establish age in the absence of evidence impeaching their authenticity

It further held, relying on Moidu K. v. State of Kerala, 2009 SCC OnLine Ker 2888, that failure to comply with Section 232 Cr.P.C. does not automatically vitiate the proceedings unless resulting prejudice is shown

The final determination was governed by the statutory appellate power under Section 374 Cr.P.C. and the acquittal provision under Section 235(1) Cr.P.C.

The Court accepted that the prosecution had adequately established PW3’s age as approximately eleven years and five months through the school admission and withdrawal register, the parents’ affidavit, and the testimony of PW4; the absence of a birth certificate was not decisive because the records remained substantially unchallenged

However, proof of age did not by itself establish the alleged assault. The Court found material inconsistencies in PW3’s account: the FIR stated that he disclosed the incident after experiencing anal pain on 01 August 2014, whereas the Section 164 statement attributed the disclosure to fear and did not mention pain as the trigger

His oral testimony also differed from PW2’s evidence regarding when the parents first became aware of the incident, and no satisfactory explanation was offered for the delay in reporting

The medical examination conducted on 01 August 2014 recorded no external injury, bleeding, tenderness, swelling, soreness or abnormal anal tone. Although absence of injury is not invariably fatal to a prosecution, the Court considered it significant here because PW3 alleged a prolonged assault causing severe pain and continued pain up to the date of disclosure

The prosecution also failed to produce an FSL report regarding the rectal swab or explain its non-production

Further doubt arose from the discrepancy between PW3’s evidence that the appellant had been brought to the police station and released on 01 August 2014 and PW7’s evidence that the appellant was arrested at Bhangal, Noida, during the intervening night of 02–03 August 2014

Finally, the Court considered the admitted quarrel between PW3’s parents and persons associated with the appellant, including the appellant’s intervention in that quarrel, as a possible background for false implication, particularly in the absence of medical support. Taken cumulatively, these circumstances rendered the prosecution case doubtful.

The inconsistencies in the disclosure narrative, the unexplained delay, the absence of supporting medical findings, the non-production of the FSL report, the arrest discrepancy, and the possibility of false implication cumulatively entitled the appellant to the benefit of doubt

The appeal was accordingly allowed; the convictions and sentences under Sections 342, 363, 377 and Part I of Section 506 IPC and Section 6 of the POCSO Act were set aside. The appellant was acquitted under Section 235(1) Cr.P.C., directed to be set at liberty, and his bail bond was cancelled