Conviction for Rape Unreliable Where Prosecutrix Fails to Identify Accused and Lacks Medical Corroboration

The appellant was convicted under Section 376 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) and sentenced to seven years of rigorous imprisonment by the Additional District and Sessions Judge-III, Bettiah, regarding an incident alleged to have occurred on June 9, 2007.

The informant (P.W. 1) alleged that the appellant entered her house at night and committed rape.

During the trial, five out of seven prosecution witnesses turned hostile.

Crucially, the victim, in her cross-examination, admitted she could not identify the assailant due to darkness and named the appellant only on suspicion the following morning.

No medical examination of the victim was conducted, and no medical officer was examined during the trial.

1. Whether the sole testimony of the prosecutrix in this case is of "sterling quality" and sufficient to sustain a conviction under Section 376 IPC in the absence of medical and independent corroborative evidence.

2. Whether the material contradictions in the victim's testimony and the existence of a prior land dispute create a reasonable doubt regarding the prosecution's case.

The court primarily applied Section 376 of the IPC regarding the punishment for rape.

It relied on the "sterling witness" doctrine established in Rai Sandeep v. State (NCT of Delhi), which requires a witness’s version to be unassailable, consistent, and of very high calibre to base a conviction on solitary testimony.

It further applied principles from Krishan Kumar Malik v. State of Haryana and Ganesan v. State, holding that while a conviction can be based on the sole testimony of a victim, it must inspire absolute confidence and be free from material lacunae.

Regarding the absence of medical evidence, the court referenced Rajesh Patel v. State of Jharkhand, noting that while non-examination of a doctor isn't always fatal, it is relevant if the oral evidence is not cogent.

The court found that the prosecution case collapsed due to the lack of "sterling" qualities in P.W. 1's testimony. Although she supported the case in her examination-in-chief, her admission in cross-examination—that darkness prevented identification and that she named the appellant on suspicion—rendered her testimony unreliable.

The court noted that the husband (P.W. 2) was a hearsay witness who expressed an unwillingness to pursue the case following the settlement of a pre-existing land/drain dispute (Nala dispute), which probabilized the defense's plea of false implication.

The total absence of medical evidence and the hostile nature of all independent witnesses (P.W. 3 to 7) meant there was no corroboration to bridge the gaps in the victim's inconsistent statements.

The Court held that the appellant was entitled to the benefit of the doubt due to the material inconsistencies in the victim's testimony and the lack of corroborative evidence. The appeal was allowed, the judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated May 25, 2010, were set aside, and the appellant was acquitted of all charges.