Conviction set aside as uncorroborated testimony of "not wholly reliable" victim fails to establish foundational facts.

The Appellant was convicted by the Trial Court for the rape of a minor (PW-5) under Section 376(3) of the IPC and Sections 5(j)(ii)/6 of the POCSO Act.

The prosecution alleged that in 2018, the victim’s father (PW-2) discovered she was pregnant after she complained of stomach pain; she subsequently alleged that 6-7 months prior, the Appellant and a juvenile co-accused (acquitted) raped her in a maize field.

During the trial, the victim and her parents provided conflicting testimonies regarding where and when an alleged abortion/miscarriage occurred—ranging from a private clinic to the police station.

The Trial Court sentenced the Appellant to 20 years of rigorous imprisonment.

The Appellant challenged the conviction on grounds of delayed FIR, lack of proof of age, and material contradictions.

1. Whether the prosecution successfully established the foundational facts, specifically the "child" status of the victim, to invoke the statutory presumptions under the POCSO Act.

2. Whether the testimonies of the victim and her parents were sufficiently reliable to sustain a conviction.

3. Whether the conviction under Section 376(3) IPC was legally sustainable given the retrospective application of the 2018 Amendment Act to a prior occurrence.

The court primarily applied Section 34(2) of the POCSO Act and Section 94 of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015, which mandate a specific hierarchy for age determination, prioritizing school certificates over medical/ossification tests.

It relied on Sections 29 and 30 of the POCSO Act regarding the presumption of culpable mental state, noting such presumptions only trigger once "foundational facts" are proven by the prosecution.

Furthermore, it observed the constitutional bar against ex post facto laws by noting that Section 376(3) IPC (inserted via Act 22 of 2018) cannot be applied to offences committed prior to its effective date of April 21, 2018.

The prosecution failed to prove the victim’s age per the statutory mandate of Section 94 of the JJ Act; despite the victim claiming to be in Class-V, no school records were produced, and the Trial Court failed to formally determine her age as required by Section 34(2) of the POCSO Act.

The Court identified "glaring" contradictions: while the parents claimed a dead fetus was delivered at the police station, the victim stated she was informed of the fetus’s death at a hospital before going to the police station, and the I.O. failed to seize any biological evidence or conduct a DNA test to link the Appellant to the pregnancy.

The victim herself stated in court that she had "no complaint" against the Appellant.

The Court noted the Trial Court erred in applying the 2018 amended sentencing (20 years) to an occurrence that took place 6-7 months before April 2018, when the minimum punishment was only 7 years.

The Court allowed the appeal, set aside the judgment of conviction dated 02.02.2023 and the order of sentence dated 06.02.2023, and ordered the immediate release of the Appellant.